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Proving Sex-Plus Discrimination through  
Comparator Evidence 
Marc Chase McAllister* 
This Article considers whether comparator evidence is required to  
prove sex-plus discrimination, an issue that has splintered courts.  Unlike a 
pure sex discrimination claim, which alleges discrimination against males 
or females as a whole, a sex-plus claim alleges discrimination against only 
a particular subgroup of males or females, such as women with children, 
based on both the plaintiff’s sex (e.g., female) and a “plus” factor (e.g., 
having children).  Plaintiffs alleging sex-plus discrimination often attempt 
to prove their claims with one of two types of comparator proof.  The first,  
referred to in this Article as “opposite sex comparator evidence,” 
compares an employer’s treatment of the plaintiff to persons of the opposite 
sex who share the same plus characteristic, such as evidence that an 
employer refuses to hire women with children but readily hires men with 
children.  The second is “same sex comparator evidence,” which instead 
shows how the employer treats persons of the same sex as the plaintiff who 
lack the plus characteristic at issue, such as evidence that an employer 
refuses to hire women with children but readily hires women without 
children.  Some courts, including the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, have 
declared that sex-plus plaintiffs “can never be successful” without opposite 
sex comparator evidence, while other courts, including the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals, have rejected this approach.  After examining this split,  
this Article makes three claims regarding comparator proof in sex-plus 
cases.  First, this Article argues that a lack of comparator evidence is not 
fatal to a sex-plus claim, as a plaintiff who lacks comparator proof may 
still prevail in other ways, including through direct evidence of 
discrimination.  Second, this Article argues that in those instances when a 
sex-plus plaintiff attempts to prove her claim with comparator evidence, 
opposite sex comparator evidence is indeed a vital component because 
without proof that the sexes were treated differently, no inference of “s ex” 
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discrimination may arise.  Finally, this Article argues that same sex 
comparator evidence remains relevant in proving a sex -plus claim, and 
that the strongest sex-plus claims are those that combine the two types of 
comparator proof. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Unlawful employment discrimination occurs when an employer treats 
an individual less favorably because of his or her protected characteristic, 
such as her race.1  Not all unfair treatment by employers is unlawful.2  
Rather, discrimination laws prohibit discriminatory treatment based on 
certain designated characteristics.3  Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, in particular, prohibits discrimination on the basis of “sex.”4 
Because of the law’s equal employment opportunity objective, 5 the 
“central question in any employment-discrimination case is whether the 
employer would have taken the same action had the employee been of a 
different race[, sex, etc.,] and everything else had remained the same.” 6  
For this reason, employment discrimination claims are often proven with 
evidence that the employer treated an employee in a protected class 
differently than those outside the employee’s protected class, such as where 
an employer promotes male but not equally-qualified female employees, 7 
 
 1  Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (describing the “central 
focus” in an employment discrimination case as “whether the employer is treating ‘some 
people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin’”) (quoting Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977)); 
Charles A. Sullivan, The Phoenix from the Ash: Proving Discrimination by Comparators, 
60 ALA. L. REV. 191, 198 (2009).  
 2  See ELEVENTH CIR. PATTERN JURY INSTR. - CIV. § 4.5 (2019) (setting forth a standard 
jury instruction for Title VII discrimination claims stating that “[a]n employer may not 
discriminate against an employee because of the employee’s [race/religion/sex/national 
origin], but the employer may [discharge or decline to promote] an employee for any other 
reason, good or bad, fair or unfair”). 
 3  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2018) (making it unlawful for an employer “to fail or 
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any 
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”); Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2018) (making it 
unlawful for an employer to discriminate on the basis of age); Americans With Disabilities 
Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2018) (making it unlawful for an employer to 
discriminate on the basis of disability).  Other significant federal statutes include the Genetic 
Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(a) (2018), which 
prohibits discrimination on the basis of genetic information; the Pregnancy Discrimination 
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2018), which states that Title VII’s prohibition against sex 
discrimination applies to discrimination on the basis of pregnancy; and the Rehabilitation 
Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), Pub. L. 93-112, 87 Stat. 394 (codified as amended at 29 
U.S.C. § 794 (2012)), which prohibits discrimination against federal government employees 
based on disabilities.  
 4  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 
 5  See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (declaring that Title 
VII “requires that persons of like qualifications be given employment opportunities 
irrespective of their sex,” such that the statute does not permit “one hiring policy for women 
and another for men”). 
 6  Carson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 82 F.3d 157, 158 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 7  See generally Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
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or imposes different requirements on similar employees of different races.8  
Subgroup discrimination claims, by contrast, focus on the employer’s 
treatment of one segment of a protected group, such as married women, 
rather than the group as a whole, such as all women (married or 
unmarried).9 
Sex-plus discrimination is one form of subgroup discrimination. 10  In  
sex-plus discrimination scenarios, an employer does not discriminate 
against all members of a protected class.11  Rather, the employer exercises a 
more specific sex-based animus targeting only a certain segment of males 
or females on the basis of the employee’s sex and another “plus” factor, as 
when an employer treats women with children differently than men with 
children (usually due to the employer’s stereotypical belief that such 
women, but not such men, will be bad employees).12 
 
 8  See, e.g., Vazquez v. Caesar’s Paradise Stream Resort, No. 3:CV-09-0625, 2013 WL 
6244568, at *4–5 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2013) (explaining how the plaintiff, an African 
American employee, brought a successful race discrimination claim where she was fired for 
wearing her hair in braids while a white employee was not).  See also Sullivan, supra note 1, 
at 200 n.42 (stating that “disparate treatment [discrimination] can rarely be established 
absent a baseline established by the employer’s treatment of members of the opposite sex or 
a different race”). 
 9  See, e.g., Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971) 
(finding employer’s no-marriage rule for stewardesses to violate Title VII, and declaring 
that Title VII “is not confined to explicit discriminations based ‘solely’ on sex,” such that 
the statute encompasses “discrimination [that] adversely affects only a portion of the 
protected class”); Jurinko v. Edwin L. Wiegand Co., 331 F. Supp. 1184, 1187 (W.D. Pa. 
1971) (refusal to hire married women violated Title VII); Rauw v. Glickman, No. CV-99-
1482-ST, 2001 WL 34039494, at *8–9 (D. Or. Aug. 6, 2001) (authorizing a sex plus marital 
status claim under Title VII); Gee-Thomas v. Cingular Wireless, 324 F. Supp. 2d 875, 884, 
888 (M.D. Tenn. 2004) (recognizing a sex-plus claim on the basis of sex plus marital and 
family status, but ultimately dismissing the plaintiff’s claim because she failed to raise a 
genuine issue of material fact for trial on the issue of pretext). 
 10  See Coleman v. B–G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 108 F.3d 1199, 1203 (10th Cir. 
1997) (recognizing that the “gender-plus” discrimination doctrine prohibits discrimination 
not against women in general, but against subclasses of women). 
 11  See King v. Ferguson Enter., Inc., 971 F. Supp. 2d 1200, 1209 (N.D. Ga. 2013) (“To 
succeed on a gender-plus claim, plaintiffs need not establish that their employer 
discriminated against the entire class of men or women; instead, they need only establish 
that their employer treated a subclass of men or women (those with the plus characteristic) 
differently from those without the plus characteristic.”), aff’d, 568 F. App’x 686 (11th Cir. 
2014). 
 12  See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544–45 (1971) (Marshall, J., 
concurring).  See also Fisher v. Vassar Coll., 70 F.3d 1420, 1433 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that 
in Phillips, “[t]he Supreme Court . . . adopted the proposition that sex considered in 
conjunction with a second characteristic—’sex plus’—can delineate a ‘protected group’ and 
can therefore serve as the basis for a Title VII suit”), aff’d en banc, 114 F.3d 1332 (2d Cir. 
1997); Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 45 (1st Cir. 2009) (discussing sex-plus 
discrimination and concluding that, under Title VII, “an employer is not free to assume that 
a woman, because she is a woman, will necessarily be a poor worker because of family 
responsibilities;” rather, “[t]he essence of Title VII in this context is that women have the 
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Because sex-plus discrimination is simply one type of “sex” 
discrimination,13 courts have recognized that a sex-plus discrimination 
plaintiff must prove, at a minimum, that the sexes were treated 
differently.14  And one common method of proving sex discrimination —
whether for a pure sex discrimination claim or a sex-plus claim—is through 
comparator evidence.15  When such comparator evidence is used to prove a 
sex-plus claim, however, courts are split over whether the proper 
comparator must be a person of the opposite sex as the plaintiff who shares 
the same plus characteristic (referred to in this Article as “opposite sex 
comparator evidence”), or whether a plaintiff may instead prevail with 
evidence regarding a comparator employee of the same sex as the plaintiff 
who lacks the “plus” characteristic at issue (referred to  in  this Article as 
“same sex comparator evidence”).16 
After examining leading sex-plus cases, this Article presents a series 
of proposals regarding the proper role of comparator evidence in such 
cases.  First, this Article argues that a lack of comparator evidence is not 
fatal to a sex-plus claim, as a plaintiff who lacks comparator proof may still 
prevail in other ways, including through direct evidence of discrimination.  
Second, this Article argues that for any sex-plus claim proven through 
comparator evidence, opposite sex comparator evidence is indeed an 
essential component.  Such comparator evidence is required, this A rticle 
contends, because evidence regarding an employer’s more favorable 
 
right to prove their mettle in the work arena without the burden of stereotypes regarding 
whether they can fulfill their responsibilities”); Smith v. AVSC Int’l, Inc., 148 F. Supp. 2d 
302, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (stating that the “sex plus” theory “recognizes that it is 
impermissible to treat men with an additional characteristic more or less favorably than 
women with the same additional characteristic”). 
 13  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2018) (making it unlawful for an employer “to . . . 
discriminate against any individual . . . because of such individual’s . . . sex”) (emphasis 
added). 
 14  See DeAngelo v. DentalEZ, Inc., 738 F. Supp. 2d 572, 584 (E.D. Pa. 2010) 
(recognizing that, “[a]t its root, . . . ‘sex-plus’ discrimination is simply a form of gender 
discrimination,” requiring the plaintiff to present sufficient evidence of sex discrimination); 
King, 971 F. Supp. 2d at 1209 (“Despite its name, the ultimate question in these cases ‘is 
whether the employer took an adverse employment action at least in part because of an 
employee’s sex.’”). 
 15  See, e.g., Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 345 (7th Cir. 2017) 
(on a claim of sexual orientation discrimination, employing “the tried-and-true comparative 
method in which we attempt to isolate the significance of the plaintiff’s sex to the 
employer’s decision: has she described a situation in which, holding all other things constant 
and changing only her sex, she would have been treated the same way?”).  See generally 
Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 Yale L.J. 728, 744-45 (2011) 
(noting that “comparators have emerged as the predominant methodological device for 
evaluating discrimination claims”). 
 16  See Philipsen v. Univ. of Mich. Bd. of Regents, No. 06-CV-11977-DT, 2007 WL 
907822, at *6–7 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 22, 2007) (discussing this split among courts). 
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treatment of an opposite sex comparator is needed to prove that the 
plaintiff’s sex played a factor in the employer’s decision, without which 
there can be no actionable claim of “sex”  discrimination.17  Third, and 
relatedly, this Article contends that same sex comparator evidence alone 
cannot raise an inference of sex discrimination because such evidence, 
while useful, does not show how the employer treats members of the 
opposite sex, without which no inference of sex discrimination may arise.18  
Finally, this Article argues that same sex comparator evidence is 
nevertheless relevant and plays an important role in proving sex-plus 
discrimination—namely, to show that the employer does not engage in sex 
discrimination across-the-board, but rather employs a more specific sex-
based animus targeting only a particular subgroup of males or f emales. 19  
For this reason, this Article contends that the strongest sex-plus claims are 
those where the two types of comparator evidence are used in tandem.20 
Take, for example, the facts of Phillips v. Martin Marietta 
Corporation, a United States Supreme Court case often cited as 
establishing the sex-plus discrimination doctrine.21  In that case, the Court 
considered an employer’s policy of refusing to  employ women, but not 
men, with pre-school aged children.22  In sex-plus terms, Phillips involves 
an allegation that the employer discriminated against the plaintiff, a female 
with children, on the basis of both her sex (female) and the plus 
characteristic of having pre-school aged children.  For such a claim, the 
relevant opposite sex comparator is a male with pre-school aged children.  
Evidence that an employer treats such an opposite sex comparator more 
favorably than the plaintiff could be used, as Phillips declared, as proof that 
the employer utilizes “one hiring policy for women and another for men,”23 
hence, that sex discrimination has occurred.24  Because such opposite sex 
 
 17  See Fisher, 70 F.3d at 1446 (rejecting sex-plus claim for lack of opposite gender 
comparator evidence, and stating that “[t]o establish that Vassar discriminated on the basis 
of sex plus marital status, plaintiff must show that married men were treated differently from 
married women”) (emphasis in original), aff’d en banc, 114 F.3d 1332 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 18  See id. at 1446–47.  See also Coleman v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 108 F.3d 
1199, 1202–05 (10th Cir. 1997) (in sex-plus-marital status claim, ruling that a female 
plaintiff must show that her male co-workers with the same marital status were treated 
differently, and reversing jury verdict for the plaintiff due to a lack of evidence on that 
point). 
 19  Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971).   
 20  See infra Part VI. 
 21  Phillips, 400 U.S. 542 (1971).   
 22  Id. at 544.   
 23  Id.   
 24  See id. (explaining that Title VII “requires that persons of like qualifications be given 
employment opportunities irrespective of their sex,” a principle violated by the employer’s 
use of one hiring policy for men and another for women).  See also Smith v. AVSC Int’l, 
Inc., 148 F. Supp. 2d 302, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (stating that the “sex plus” theory 
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comparator evidence directly exposes the employer’s differential treatment 
of the sexes, albeit at the subgroup level, this is the most persuasive type of 
comparator evidence a plaintiff can invoke in a sex-plus case.  This is not 
to suggest, however, that intra-group comparisons are not also relevant.  
Recall that in a sex-plus case, the plaintiff does not allege that her employer 
harbors discriminatory animus against women as a whole; rather, she 
alleges a more specific sex-based animus targeting only a particular 
segment of females.  Such targeted animus can be exposed with evidence 
that an employer treats women with children less favorably than it treats 
either (a) men with children or (b) women without children, usually due to  
the employer’s stereotypical belief that women with children, but not these 
comparator subgroups, will be unreliable employees.25  For this reason, 
courts have found that a sex-plus plaintiff may establish a prima facie case 
of discrimination in part based on evidence that she was rejected in favor of 
a member of the same sex without the relevant plus characteristic.26 
Before examining the role of comparator evidence in sex-plus cases, 
Part II of this Article sets forth the general framework for analyzing pure 
sex discrimination claims under Title VII.  Part III then turns to  sex-plus 
discrimination claims, and provides examples where the doctrine has been 
applied by courts.  Part IV summarizes cases requiring sex-plus 
discrimination claims to be proven with opposite sex comparator evidence.  
Turning to same sex comparator evidence, Part V reviews cases either 
rejecting the purported requirement of opposite sex comparator evidence or 
permitting a sex-plus plaintiff to prove her claim through same sex 
comparator evidence.  Finally, Part VI argues that opposite sex comparator 
evidence is indeed required to prove sex-plus discrimination through 
comparator evidence, and that the strongest sex-plus claims are those where 
both opposite sex and same sex comparator evidence are used in  tandem.  
In addition, Part VI argues that comparator evidence is just one means of 
proving a sex-plus discrimination claim, and that a plaintiff who lacks 
opposite sex comparator evidence may still prevail through other 
evidentiary methods.  Part VII concludes. 
 
“recognizes that it is impermissible to treat men with an additional characteristic more or 
less favorably than women with the same additional characteristic”). 
 25  See Trezza v. Hartford, Inc., No. 98 CIV. 2205(MBM), 1998 WL 912101, at *5–6 
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 1998) (rejecting the defendant’s argument that the plaintiff, a female 
with children, could not prove sex discrimination because another woman, one without 
children, received the promotion over the plaintiff). 
 26  See, e.g., McGrenaghan v. St. Denis Sch., 979 F. Supp. 323, 326–27 (E.D. Pa. 1997) 
(finding that a teacher could maintain a Title VII sex discrimination claim as a member of a 
subclass of women with disabled children, and rejecting the defendant’s argument that her 
claim must fail because the person selected for the position over the plaintiff was also a 
woman, albeit one without a disabled child). 
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II. GENERAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING DISPARATE TREATMENT 
DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS 
Employment discrimination statutes prohibit an employer from 
discriminating against individuals on the basis of certain protected 
characteristics, such as race or sex.27  Determining exactly how a plaintiff 
should go about proving employment discrimination has proven difficult 
for courts and scholars, which have adopted or advanced a variety of 
evidentiary approaches and frameworks.28  Although this Article does not 
attempt to resolve these various approaches and frameworks, it does 
identify the relevant judicial constructs that may be applied to the sex-plus 
discrimination scenario. 
Regardless of the protected characteristic at issue, victims of 
employment discrimination usually pursue one of f our types of claims: 
disparate treatment,29 disparate impact,30 harassment,31 or retaliation.32  The 
first type of claim, disparate treatment, is used to prove intentional acts of 
discrimination,33 where the use of comparator evidence is prevalent.34  
 
 27  See supra note 2. 
 28  See Martin J. Katz, Reclaiming McDonnell Douglas, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 109, 
159–68 (2007) (describing numerous circuit splits and various debates that have “plagued” 
employment discrimination law); see also Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 852–
54 (9th Cir. 2002) (describing one circuit split regarding the nature of “direct” evidence), 
aff’d, 539 U.S. 90 (2003); Ortiz v. Werner Enter., Inc., 834 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2016) 
(attempting to clarify the proof requirements for Title VII claims). 
 29  See, e.g., Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 985–86 (1988). 
 30  See, e.g., Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 240 (2005) (authorizing disparate 
impact claims under the ADEA); Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424, 430–31 (1971) 
(authorizing disparate impact claims under Title VII). 
 31  See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986) (authorizing 
sexual harassment claims under Title VII); Rickard v. Swedish Match N. Am., Inc., 773 
F.3d 181, 184–85 (8th Cir. 2014) (discussing workplace harassment claims based on either 
sex or age). 
 32  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2018) (making it unlawful under Title VII “for an 
employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment . . . 
because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this 
subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any 
manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter”); 29 U.S.C. 
§ 623(d) (2018) (making it unlawful under the ADEA “for an employer to discriminate 
against any of his employees or applicants for employment . . . because such individual . . . 
has opposed any practice made unlawful by [the ADEA], or because such individual . . . has 
made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, 
proceeding, or litigation under this chapter”). 
 33  Watson, 487 U.S. at 986–87; see also Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. 
Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 852 F.3d 1018, 1024 (11th Cir. 2016) (explaining that the 
disparate treatment and disparate impact theories of discrimination “are not 
interchangeable” and that “courts must be careful to distinguish between the[m]”); id. 
(noting that “[t]o prevail on a disparate treatment claim, a Title VII plaintiff must 
demonstrate that an employer intentionally discriminated against her on the basis of a 
protected characteristic,” whereas “a disparate impact claim does not require proof of 
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Disparate impact claims, by contrast, focus on the discriminatory effect of 
an employer’s seemingly neutral practice, procedure, or test, and do not 
require a plaintiff to prove discriminatory intent.35  Although all four types 
of claims are generally available across federal employment discrimination 
statutes, this Article focuses on disparate treatment claims, which are most 
commonly used to prove sex-plus discrimination.36 
Whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail on a disparate treatment 
discrimination claim depends somewhat on whether the case involves a 
“single motive” or “mixed motive” claim.37  For a mixed motive claim, a 
plaintiff may prevail if she can demonstrate that the adverse employment 
action she experienced was motivated by both permissible and forbidden 
reasons—in other words, by proving that her gender was “a motivating 
factor” in the employer’s decision, rather than “the sole motivating 
factor.”38  In a mixed motive claim, however, the employer may present the 
affirmative defense that it “would have taken the same action in the 
absence of the impermissible motivating factor.”39  While this defense does 
not completely absolve the employer of liability, it may limit the plaintiff’s 
available remedies by precluding, among other things, money damages.40 
In a “single motive” claim, by contrast, a plaintiff must prove by a 
preponderance of evidence that the employer’s “true” motive was 
discriminatory, which, unlike mixed motive claims, allows the plaintiff to  
 
discriminatory intent” and instead “targets an employment practice that has an actual, 
though not necessarily deliberate, adverse impact on protected groups”).  
 34  See Sullivan, supra note 1, at 202–09 (discussing the use of comparator evidence in 
disparate treatment cases). 
 35  See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429–30. 
 36  See, e.g., Fuller v. GTE Corp./Contel Cellular, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 653, 656 (M.D. 
Tenn. 1996) (describing the plaintiff’s Title VII claim as one alleging “disparate treatment 
because of [plaintiff’s] gender and her status as a mother with young children”). 
 37  See Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016) (“[I]n a 
‘mixed-motive’ case a plaintiff claims that an employment decision was based on both 
legitimate and illegitimate reasons.  Such cases are in contrast to so-called ‘pretext’ cases, in 
which a plaintiff claims that an employer’s stated justification for an employment decision 
is false.”). 
 38  Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 284 (4th Cir. 2004).  
This requirement derives from 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), which states that “an unlawful 
employment practice [under Title VII] is established when the complaining party 
demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for 
any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.”  42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-2(m) (2018).  See also Hill, 354 F.3d at 284.  
 39  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). 
 40  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (clarifying that a successful affirmative defense 
limits the available remedies to declaratory relief, injunctive relief, “and attorney’s fees and 
costs”); Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 348–49 (2013) (discussing the 
distinction between the employer’s original defense pertaining to liability, and its current 
defense pertaining to the plaintiff’s remedies).   
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obtain money damages.41  Unlike a mixed motive claim, then, the critical 
issue in a single motive claim is whether a legal or illegal motive, but not 
both, prompted the employer’s action.42 
Regardless of whether a plaintiff pursues a single or mixed motive 
claim, the plaintiff may prove her employer’s discriminatory intent with 
either direct or circumstantial evidence.43  Direct evidence of 
discriminatory intent has been defined as “evidence which, if believed  .  .  .  
does not require a factfinder to draw any inferences in order to  conclude 
that the challenged employment action was motivated at least in  part by 
prejudice against members of the protected group.”44  Direct evidence 
would include, for example, “a facially discriminatory employment policy 
or a corporate decision maker’s express statement of a desire to  remove 
employees in the protected group.”45 
When there is no direct evidence of discriminatory intent in  a single 
motive claim, the type of claim most commonly asserted in a sex-plus 
case,46 courts have traditionally employed the burden-shifting f ramework 
of McDonnell Douglas v. Green47 to determine whether there is sufficient 
circumstantial evidence to prove discriminatory intent. 48  Because direct 
 
 41  See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507–08 (1993). 
 42  See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 260 (1989) (White, J., concurring) 
(citations omitted) (explaining that in single-motive cases “the issue is whether either illegal 
or legal motives, but not both, were the ‘true’ motives behind the decision,” whereas in 
mixed-motive cases, “there is no one ‘true’ motive behind the decision,” which is 
“[i]nstead . . . a result of multiple factors, at least one of which is legitimate”). 
 43  See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101–02 (2003) (interpreting Title VII 
to allow plaintiffs to bring mixed-motive discrimination claims based solely on 
circumstantial evidence). 
 44  Johnson v. Kroger Co., 319 F.3d 858, 865 (6th Cir. 2003).  See also Bodenheimer v. 
PPG Indus., Inc., 5 F.3d 955, 958 (5th Cir. 1993) (defining direct evidence as “evidence 
which, if believed, would prove the existence of a fact (i.e., unlawful discrimination) 
without any inferences or presumptions”). 
 45  Nguyen v. City of Cleveland, 229 F.3d 559, 563 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 46  See, e.g., Fisher v. Vassar Coll., 70 F.3d 1420, 1432 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that the 
plaintiff’s sex-plus-marital status claim is not a mixed-motive case), aff’d en banc, 114 F.3d 
1332 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 47  411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
 48  See Williams v. Zurz, 503 F. App’x 367, 374–75 (6th Cir. 2012) (“In cases involving 
circumstantial evidence, this Circuit has long applied the . . . McDonnell Douglas 
framework.”); King v. Ferguson Enters., Inc., 971 F. Supp. 2d 1200, 1210 (N.D. Ga. 2013) 
(stating that “[i]n the Eleventh Circuit, sex-discrimination claims based on circumstantial 
evidence are analyzed under the burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell 
Douglas. . . .”), aff’d, 568 F. App’x 686 (11th Cir. 2014); Fuller v. GTE Corp./Contel 
Cellular, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 653, 656 (M.D. Tenn. 1996) (stating that “[t]he McDonnell 
Douglas formula is inapplicable to cases in which the Title VII plaintiff presents credible, 
direct evidence of discriminatory animus”); Jordan v. Radiology Imaging Assocs., 577 F. 
Supp. 2d 771, 785 (D. Md. 2008) (noting that in the absence of direct evidence of 
discrimination, the court would apply the McDonnell Douglas framework to analyze the 
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evidence is hard to come by, the McDonnell Douglas test is often applied.49 
The McDonnell Douglas test first requires a plaintiff to present 
evidence of a prima facie case of discrimination.50  The precise 
requirements of the prima facie case vary51 depending on the type of 
adverse employment action at issue.52  In the hiring context, for example, 
the plaintiff must show not only that he belongs to a protected class, but 
also that he applied and was qualified for an available job; that he was 
rejected, despite his qualifications; and that, after his rejection, the position 
remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons 
of the complainant’s qualifications.53 
If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, a 
rebuttable presumption of unlawful discrimination arises. 54  The burden 
then shifts to the employer to produce evidence of a “legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason” for its adverse employment action, which it 
must do to avoid liability.55  If the defendant carries its burden, the 
presumption of unlawful discrimination is rebutted, and the burden then 
shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the defendant’s nondiscriminatory 
explanation is pretextual and that the employer was more likely motivated 
 
plaintiff’s sex-plus claim); Philipsen v. Univ. of Mich. Bd. of Regents, No. 06-CV-11977-
DT, 2007 WL 907822, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 22, 2007) (applying the McDonnell Douglas 
test after finding that a sex-plus plaintiff had failed to produce direct evidence of 
discrimination).  See also Katz, supra note 28, at 124–25 (explaining that the McDonnell 
Douglas test provides another avenue, beyond direct evidence, for plaintiffs to prove that 
the adverse employment action at issue occurred “because of” the plaintiff’s protected 
characteristic, namely, by casting doubt on the employer’s explanation in an effort to prove 
the employer’s explanation was a cover-up for discrimination). 
 49  See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 271 (1989) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (stating that “the entire purpose of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case is 
to compensate for the fact that direct evidence of intentional discrimination is hard to come 
by”).  See also Katz, supra note 28, at 120 (noting that the “McDonnell Douglas [test] 
remains firmly entrenched in disparate treatment law”).   
 50  McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802. 
 51  See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002) (noting that “the precise 
requirements of the prima facie case can vary with the context and were ‘never intended to 
be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic’”) (citation omitted). 
 52  See Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 970–71 (11th Cir. 2008) (describing an 
“adverse employment action” under Title VII as “a serious and material change in the terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment”); Smith v. City of Salem, Ohio, 378 F.3d 566, 
575–76 (6th Cir. 2004) (defining an “adverse employment action” under Title VII as a 
“materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of [plaintiff’s] employment,” and 
finding that a  
twenty-four-hour suspension, which was the equivalent of three eight-hour days, could 
constitute an adverse employment action).   
 53  McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802. 
 54  U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714 (1983). 
 55  McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802. 
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by discriminatory intent.56  Thus, although the burden of production shifts 
back and forth, the burden of persuading the factfinder that the defendant 
intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains “at all times with 
the plaintiff.”57 
By ultimately requiring the plaintiff to prove that discriminatory intent 
is the more likely explanation for the employer’s action, as opposed to one 
possible motivation,58 the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis is 
generally thought to be distinct from the motivating factor framework 
employed in mixed motive cases,59 and is typically more difficult for a 
 
 56  Id. at 804; St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507–08 (1993).  See also 
Fisher v. Vassar Coll., 70 F.3d 1420, 1433 (2d Cir. 1995) (recognizing that it is not enough 
for a plaintiff to show that the defendant’s non-discriminatory explanation is pretextual; 
rather, the plaintiff must also prove that discrimination was the true motive for the decision), 
aff’d en banc, 114 F.3d 1332 (2d Cir. 1997); id. at 1448 (finding the plaintiff proved pretext, 
but failed to prove that sex discrimination was the employer’s true motive); id. at 1437 
(stating that “our ruling on pretext does not require as a corollary that we affirm the ultimate 
finding on discrimination”).  But see Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 
133, 147–48 (2000) (clarifying that the evidence of discrimination put forth in the plaintiff’s 
prima facie case, combined with the evidence that the employer’s asserted justification is 
false, “may [be alone sufficient to] permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer 
unlawfully discriminated”). 
 57  Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).  
 58  See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 506–07.   
 59  See Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 45 (1st Cir. 2009) (explaining that the 
plaintiff “presses her claim under two separate . . . theories,” the first a “mixed motives” 
claim under Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003), and the second “a traditional 
discrimination claim under the familiar McDonnell Douglas burden shifting scheme”); 
Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016) (“A Title VII plaintiff may 
make a claim for discrimination ‘under either the pretext theory set forth in McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green, . . . or the mixed-motive theory . . . under which a plaintiff may 
show that an employment decision was made based on both legitimate and illegitimate 
reasons.”) (citation omitted); Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 
284–85 (4th Cir. 2004) (noting that a plaintiff may “establish a claim for intentional sex . . . 
discrimination through two avenues of proof,” first, under a mixed-motive theory, “by 
demonstrating through direct or circumstantial evidence that sex . . . discrimination 
motivated the employer’s adverse employment decision,” and second, “under a ‘pretext’ 
framework, . . . [by] demonstrate[ing] that the employer’s proffered permissible reason for 
taking an adverse employment action is actually a pretext for discrimination”); Criner v. 
Tex.-N.M. Power Co., 470 F. App’x 364, 369 (5th Cir. 2012) (stating that because the 
plaintiff “did not adequately press a mixed-motive argument before the district court,” the 
district court correctly applied the McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis to her Title VII 
discrimination claims); Hashem–Younes v. Danou Enters. Inc., 311 F. App’x 777, 779 (6th 
Cir. 2009) (affirming district court’s application of the McDonnell Douglas framework 
where the plaintiff failed to raise a mixed-motive claim in her complaint or in her response 
to the defendant’s summary judgment motion); Bird v. W. Valley City, 832 F.3d 1188, 1200 
n.6 (10th Cir. 2016) (“Plaintiff does not argue . . . that [her employer] had ‘mixed motives’ 
when firing her, and she thus does not contend that illegal gender discrimination played 
[only] a ‘motivating part’ in the employment decision.  For this reason, we utilize the 
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework alone in analyzing her attempt to prove 
illegal gender discrimination.”) (internal marks and citations omitted); Fye v. Okla. Corp. 
Comm’n, 516 F.3d 1217, 1225 (10th Cir. 2008) (noting that courts do not employ the 
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plaintiff to meet.60  In addition, a court’s analysis under McDonnell 
Douglas often boils down to whether the plaintiff has produced sufficient 
evidence of pretext, an analysis that may hinge on comparator proof. 61  
Although the pretext requirement can be stated in various ways, essentially 
it requires the plaintiff to prove that the employer’s proffered legitimate 
explanation is “unworthy of credence,”62 and was not the actual reason f or 
its employment action, but instead a fabrication to conceal the employer’s 
true, illegal motive.63  Such a showing can be made when a plaintiff 
demonstrates that the employer’s explanation should not be believed 
“because it has no basis in fact,” or when the plaintiff simply persuades the 
court that a prohibited reason more likely motivated the employer. 64  As 
one court declared, “[t]he more idiosyncratic or questionable the 
employer’s reason, the easier it will be to expose as a pretext, if indeed it is 
one.”65 
In sum, when a plaintiff relies on circumstantial evidence to  prove 
intentional discrimination for a single motive claim, the type of claim most 
commonly asserted in a sex-plus case,66 the plaintiff must typically satisfy 
the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting test to avoid dismissal of her 
 
McDonnell Douglas framework in mixed-motives claims).   
 60  See Harrison v. Belk, Inc., 748 F. App’x 936, 941 n.1 (11th Cir. 2018) (describing 
the McDonnell Douglas test as a “more burdensome standard” as compared to the “mixed-
motives” standard). 
 61  See Sullivan, supra note 1, at 206 (noting that courts often look to comparator proof 
at the pretext stage, where “the absence of a comparator is often fatal to the claim”); id. at 
208 n.72 (citing cases illustrating that discrimination plaintiffs tend to lose when they fail to 
generate relevant comparator proof).  See, e.g., Sherman v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 188 F.3d 
509 (6th Cir. 1999) (rejecting the plaintiff’s sex and sex-plus-age discrimination claims 
based on her inability to prove pretext); cf. Fisher, 70 F.3d at 1434–48 (rejecting the 
plaintiff’s sex-plus-marital status claim based on insufficient evidence to prove that 
plaintiff’s tenure denial was ultimately the result of discrimination, even though the plaintiff 
had proven pretext), aff’d en banc, 114 F.3d 1332 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 62  Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. 
 63  Chen v. Dow Chem. Co., 580 F.3d 394, 400 (6th Cir. 2009).  See also Millbrook v. 
IBP, Inc., 280 F.3d 1169, 1175 (7th Cir. 2002) (defining pretext as “a lie, specifically a 
phony reason for some action”); Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256 (stating that at the pretext stage, 
the plaintiff “now must have the opportunity to demonstrate that the proffered reason was 
not the true reason for the employment decision,” a burden that “now merges with the 
ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has been the victim of intentional 
discrimination”).  
 64  Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1047 (8th Cir. 2011) (“There are at 
least two ways a plaintiff may demonstrate a material question of fact regarding pretext.  A 
plaintiff may show that the employer’s explanation is ‘unworthy of credence . . . because it 
has no basis in fact.’  Alternatively, a plaintiff may show pretext ‘by persuading the court 
that a [prohibited] reason more likely motivated the employer.’”). 
 65  Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1012 n.6 (1st Cir. 1979). 
 66  See, e.g., Fisher v. Vassar Coll., 70 F.3d 1420, 1432 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that the 
plaintiff’s sex-plus-marital status claim is not a mixed-motive case), aff’d en banc, 114 F.3d 
1332 (2d Cir. 1997). 
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claim.67  A court’s analysis under McDonnell Douglas often boils down to 
whether the plaintiff can show that her employer’s stated legitimate reason 
for its employment action was pretextual and that the employer was more 
likely motivated by discriminatory intent, which will often hinge on 
comparator evidence.68  If a plaintiff survives the McDonnell Douglas 
analysis and avoids summary judgment, the employer’s true motivation 
would then become the primary issue at  trial.69  With these general 
principles in mind, this Article now considers the specific sex-plus 
discrimination scenario. 
III. SEX-PLUS DISCRIMINATION 
Under the sex-plus discrimination doctrine, a plaintiff, often f emale, 
may bring a Title VII claim for sex discrimination if she can show that her 
employer discriminated against her not because of her sex per se, but 
because of the combination of her sex plus some additional factor, such as 
having young children.70  As courts have developed the doctrine, the “plus” 
factor in a sex-plus case must pertain either to an immutable characteristic 
or the exercise of a fundamental right.71  This section examines these two 
 
 67  McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).   
 68  Compare Philipsen v. Univ. of Mich. Bd. of Regents, No. 06-CV-11977-DT, 2007 
WL 907822, at *6–9 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 22, 2007) (applying the McDonnell Douglas test and 
granting summary judgment to the defendant on  sex-plus claim due to a lack of evidence 
that the plaintiff was treated differently than males with young children), with Stalter v. 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 195 F.3d 285, 289–90 (7th Cir. 1999) (in a race discrimination claim, 
finding the plaintiff’s evidence of pretext “more than sufficient evidence to impugn the 
genuineness of Wal-Mart’s motives,” in part due to evidence that the plaintiff’s employer 
provided more lenient treatment to a similarly situated Caucasian employee who committed 
a similar act). 
 69  See Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 855 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that 
the McDonnell Douglas “legal proof structure is a tool to assist plaintiffs at the summary 
judgment stage so that they may reach trial”), aff’d, 539 U.S. 90 (2003); Tex. Dep’t of 
Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981) (noting that the plaintiff bears “[t]he 
ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated 
against the plaintiff”).  See also Dudley v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 166 F.3d 1317, 1322 (11th 
Cir. 1999) (declaring that “it is unnecessary and inappropriate to instruct the jury on the 
McDonnell Douglas analysis”); Costa, 299 F.3d at 855 (same); Palmer v. Bd. of Regents of 
Univ. Sys. of Ga., 208 F.3d 969, 974 (11th Cir. 2000) (declaring that although phrases such 
as “prima facie case” or “burden of production” should not be explained to a jury, the 
plaintiff still “bears the ultimate burden of proving that discriminatory animus was a 
determinative factor in the adverse employment decision”). 
 70  See Franchina v. City of Providence, 881 F.3d 32, 54 (1st Cir. 2018) (recognizing 
that in sex-plus claims, “the simple question posed . . . is whether the employer took an 
adverse employment action at least in part because of an employee’s sex,” and applying the 
sex-plus theory to plaintiffs who were allegedly discriminated against at least in part 
because of their gender where the “plus-factor” is sexual orientation) (alteration in original). 
 71  Jefferies v. Harris Cty. Cmty. Action Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1033 (5th Cir. 1980).  
The sex-plus theory of discrimination does not apply when the “plus” factor at issue does 
not involve an immutable characteristic, such as race or national origin, or a constitutionally 
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types of sex-plus discrimination claims. 
A. Sex Plus Discrimination Claims Involving a Fundamental Right 
The United States Supreme Court first ratified the notion that Title 
VII could be violated by an employer’s discriminatory treatment of a 
subclass of women in Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corporation .72  In 
Phillips, the Court declared that sex discrimination may occur through an 
employer’s policy of refusing to employ women, but not men, with pre -
school aged children.73 
Just as importantly, Phillips established that when an employer 
discriminates against a particular subgroup of women, such as women with 
children, the employer may not defend its actions with evidence that it does 
not discriminate against women on the whole.74  The Court thus deemed it 
irrelevant that at least seventy-five percent of the persons hired for the 
position at issue were women, albeit those without children, given that 
discrimination had occurred against a specific subgroup of women—i.e.,  
those with young children.75  As such, although the Phillips defendant had 
attempted to show that no sex discrimination had occurred with what this 
Article refers to as “same sex comparator evidence,” this evidence actually  
had the opposite effect.  Rather than disproving the plaintiff’s claim, this 
evidence in fact highlighted the employer’s unique stereotypical biases 
against the particular subgroup of women to which the plaintiff belonged, 
thereby demonstrating its relevance. 
In another case involving a sex-plus discrimination claim with a 
“plus” characteristic involving a fundamental right, McGrenaghan v. St. 
Denis School, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania ruled that a teacher could maintain a Title VII sex 
discrimination claim as a member of a subclass of women with disabled 
children.76  There, the court found evidence of discriminatory animus 
against mothers with disabled children, including direct evidence of 
discriminatory animus by the school’s principal.77  Similar to Phillips , the 
 
protected fundamental right, such as marriage or child rearing.  See id. at 1033–34.  For 
example, courts have rejected sex-plus discrimination claims in the context of gender 
differentiated appearance requirements, such as employer policies imposing different 
makeup or hair length requirements for men and women.  See Marc Chase McAllister, 
Extending the Sex Plus Discrimination Doctrine to Age Discrimination Claims , 60 B.C. L. 
REV. 469, 485–87 (2019) (discussing the limits of sex-plus theory).   
 72  400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971). 
 73  Phillips, 400 U.S. at 544.   
 74  See id. at 543–44.   
 75  Id.   
 76  McGrenaghan v. St. Denis Sch., 979 F. Supp. 323, 327 (E.D. Pa. 1997). 
 77  Id. at 327. 
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court thus rejected the defendant’s argument that it could not be liable f or 
sex discrimination on the basis that the person hired for the position was 
also a woman, reasoning that the person hired was “not a member of the 
subclass of women with disabled children” to which the plaintiff 
belonged.78 
Phillips and McGrenaghan are examples of sex-plus discrimination 
claims brought by female employees treated differently than their male 
counterparts for having children.79  Courts have recognized similar 
subclasses of women based on their exercise of other fundamental rights. 80  
Courts have found, for example, that an employer’s unfavorable treatment 
of married women, as compared to married men, violates Title VII.81 
In the sex-plus-marital status cases, as in Phillips and McGrenaghan , 
courts have rejected employer arguments that no sex discrimination had 
occurred because the employer did not discriminate against women as a 
whole.82  In one such case, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit noted that an employer’s no-marriage rule, which it applied 
to female flight attendants but not their male counterparts, violated Title 
VII even though the rule did not apply to all f emale employees, “for so 
long as sex is a factor in the application of the rule, such application 
involves a discrimination based on sex.”83  Thus, the Seventh Circuit 
declared, Title VII’s effect “is not to be diluted because discrimination 
adversely affects only a portion of the protected class.”84  As another court 
 
 78  Id.  Accordingly, the court denied summary judgment to the defendant on the 
plaintiff’s sex discrimination claim.  Id. 
 79  See also Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 48 (1st Cir. 2009) (denying 
summary judgment to the defendant-employer on similar sex plus discrimination claim); 
Philipsen v. Univ. of Mich. Bd. of Regents, No. 06-CV-11977-DT, 2007 WL 907822, at *6–
9 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 22, 2007) (recognizing a similar claim, but granting summary judgment 
to the defendant on the plaintiff’s “sex plus” claim due to a lack of evidence that the 
plaintiff was treated differently than males with young children).  
 80  Jefferies v. Harris Cty. Cmty. Action Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1033 (5th Cir. 1980). 
 81  See Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971) (finding 
employer’s no-marriage rule for stewardesses to violate Title VII); Jurinko v. Wiegand Co., 
331 F. Supp. 1184, 1187 (W.D. Pa. 1971) (finding that employer’s refusal to hire married 
women violated Title VII).  See also Coleman v. B–G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 108 F.3d 
1199, 1202–05 (10th Cir. 1997) (in sex-plus-marital status claim, ruling that a female 
plaintiff must show that her male co-workers with the same marital status were treated 
differently, and reversing jury verdict for the plaintiff due to a lack of evidence on that 
point); Gee-Thomas v. Cingular Wireless, 324 F. Supp. 2d 875, 884, 888 (M.D. Tenn. 2004) 
(recognizing a sex plus claim on the basis of sex plus marital and family status, but 
ultimately dismissing the plaintiff’s claim because she failed to raise a genuine issue of 
material fact for trial on the issue of pretext).  
 82  See Jurinko, 331 F. Supp. at 1187 (rejecting the argument).   
 83  See Sprogis, 444 F.2d at 1198 (adopting the reasoning of the EEOC, as expressed in 
29 CFR § 1604.3(a)). 
 84  Id.   
MCALLIS TER (DO NO T DELETE)  1/9/2020   4:21 PM 
2020] PROVING SEX-PLUS DISCRIMINATION  773 
in a similar case declared, “[i]f [a] company discriminates against married 
women, but not against married men, the variable[s] become[] [men and] 
women, and the discrimination, based on solely sexual distinctions, 
invidious and unlawful.”85 
B. Sex-Plus Discrimination Claims Involving Immutable 
Characteristics 
As noted, the sex-plus theory applies when an employer discriminates 
against a particular subclass of males or females based on the exercise of a 
fundamental right, such as the right to marry or have children;86 or an 
immutable characteristic, such as race.87  Immutable characteristics are 
simply those the employee cannot change.88 
In the past fifty years, courts have recognized various p lus-
discrimination claims involving a combination of immutable 
characteristics, including claims of discrimination based on sex -plus-race 
(e.g., alleging discrimination against black females89 or against Asian 
females),90 race-plus-religion (e.g., alleging discrimination against a white 
Jewish male),91 and sex-plus-age (e.g., involving discrimination against 
older women).92 
In a leading sex-plus-race case, Jefferies v. Harris County Community 
Action Association,93 plaintiff Dafro Jefferies, a black female, alleged that 
her employer discriminated against her due to her race and sex. 94  The 
district court separated Jefferies’ single sex-plus-race claim into distinct 
 
 85  Jurinko, 331 F. Supp. at 1187. 
 86  See supra Part II.A. 
 87  See Arnett v. Aspin, 846 F. Supp. 1234, 1239 (E.D. Pa. 1994); Nicole Buonocore 
Porter, Sex Plus Age Discrimination: Protecting Older Women Workers, 81 DENV. U. L. 
REV. 79, 87 (2003). 
 88  David Schraub, Unsuspecting, 96 B.U. L. REV. 361, 378 (2016) (citing Frontiero v. 
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973)). 
 89  See, e.g., Jefferies v. Harris Cty. Cmty. Action Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1034 (5th Cir. 
1980) (recognizing a subclass of black women or a sex-plus-race claim). 
 90  See, e.g., Lam v. Univ. of Haw., 40 F.3d 1551, 1561–62 (9th Cir. 1994) (recognizing 
a subclass of Asian women or a sex-plus-race claim). 
 91  See, e.g., Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 153 (2d Cir. 2004) (finding sufficient 
evidence “to support an inference that [Feingold] was terminated on the basis of his religion 
and/or race”). 
 92  See, e.g., Cartee v. Wilbur Smith Assocs., Inc., C/A No. 3:08-4132-JFA-PJG, 2010 
WL 1052082, at *4 (D.S.C. Mar. 22, 2010).  
 93  615 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1980). 
 94  Id. at 1028.  “In her complaint, Jefferies charged that HCCAA discriminated against 
her in promotion ‘because she is a woman, up in age and because she is Black.’”  Id. at 
1029.  Jefferies’ age-based discrimination claim, however, did not materialize at trial, and 
was not before the court on appeal.  Id. at 1030.   
MCALLIS TER (DO NO T DELETE)  1/9/2020   4:20 PM 
774 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:757 
claims of race discrimination and sex discrimination.95  This, in turn, 
allowed the district court to reject Jefferies’ race discrimination claim 
based on evidence that the promotion she sought was instead f illed by a 
black male, in other words, with opposite sex comparator evidence. 96  The 
district court then rejected Jefferies’ sex discrimination claim due to 
evidence that sixty to seventy percent of the defendant’s employees were 
female, who often held important positions within the organization.97 
Overturning the district court’s decision, the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals found it improper to separate Jefferies’ single sex-plus-race 
discrimination claim into separate claims of race and sex discrimination.98  
This was error, according to the court, because “discrimination against 
black females can exist even in the absence of discrimination against black 
men or white women.”99  Echoing Phillips, the court thus concluded that 
the employer’s relatively favorable treatment of black males and white 
females may not be used to disprove the plaintiff’s allegations of sex -plus 
discrimination, as black men and white women fall outside the relevant 
subclass of black females.100  This analysis, in turn, suggests that opposite 
sex comparator evidence (here, focused on the employer’s treatment of 
black males) and same sex comparator evidence (here, focused on the 
employer’s treatment of white females), can be used by a plaintiff as 
evidence of the employer’s targeted sex-based animus, rather than the other 
way around.101 
 
 95  See id. at 1032. 
 96  Id. at 1030 (rejecting Jefferies’ claim of pure race discrimination in promotion, given 
that the person promoted to the position at issue was also black). 
 97  Id. at 1029. 
 98  Id. at 1032. 
 99  Jefferies, 615 F.2d at 1032. 
 100  See id. at 1034.  See also Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: 
Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 
1241, 1243–44 (1991) (“[T]he experiences of women of color are frequently the product of 
intersecting patterns of racism and sexism, and . . . tend not to be represented within the 
discourses of either feminism or antiracism.”). 
 101  Jefferies is one example of a sex-plus claim combining multiple immutable 
characteristics.  A variety of courts have ratified sex-plus claims by subclasses of employees 
in similar circumstances.  See, e.g., Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1416–17 
(10th Cir. 1987) (adopting the reasoning of Jefferies in recognizing a sex-plus-race hostile 
work environment claim); Robertson v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 3:14-CV-01861 
(VLB), 2017 WL 326317, at *8 (D. Conn. Jan. 23, 2017) (recognizing that “[a] plaintiff 
may bring a [discrimination] claim under a combination of two protected grounds of Title 
VII, such as race and gender”); Walton v. Vilsack, No. 09-7627, 2011 WL 3489967, at *10 
(E.D. La. Aug. 10, 2011) (rejecting the defendant’s argument that a plaintiff cannot present 
evidence of discrimination against her as an African-American female); Johnson v. Dillard’s 
Inc., No. 3:03–3445–MBS, 2007 WL 2792232, at *3–5 (D.S.C. Sept. 24, 2007) (in a lengthy 
discussion of the issue, recognizing a combination claim alleging race-plus-sex 
discrimination under Title VII); Nieto v. Kapoor, 182 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1140 (D.N.M. 
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IV. COMPARATOR EVIDENCE IN SEX-PLUS CASES:  REQUIREMENT OF A 
COMPARATOR OUTSIDE PLAINTIFF’S PROTECTED CLASS WHO SHARES THE 
SAME “PLUS” CHARACTERISTIC 
The remainder of this Article focuses on the evidentiary requirements 
for proving sex-plus discrimination.  This section begins with opposite sex 
comparator evidence, defined as evidence pertaining to a person of the 
opposite sex as the plaintiff who shares the same plus characteristic.  As 
explained below, numerous courts have held, or impliedly expressed the 
view, that Title VII sex-plus discrimination claims necessarily f ail in  the 
absence of opposite sex comparator evidence.  Courts expressing this 
approach include the United States Courts of Appeal for the Second, Third, 
and Tenth Circuits,102 along with various federal district courts.103 
 
2000) (considering evidence of harassment based on both race and their sex); Chambers v. 
Omaha Girls Club, 629 F. Supp. 925, 944 (D. Neb. 1986) (treating the plaintiff’s race and 
gender discrimination claims as involving “the class of black women”), aff’d sub nom. 
Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, Inc., 834 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1987); Graham v. Bendix 
Corp., 585 F. Supp. 1036, 1047 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (“Under Title VII, the plaintiff as a black 
woman is protected against discrimination on the double grounds of race and sex, and an 
employer who singles out black females for less favorable treatment does not defeat 
plaintiff’s case by showing that white females or black males are not so unfavorably 
treated.”).   
 102  See Coleman v. B–G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 108 F.3d 1199, 1202–05 (10th 
Cir. 1997) (ruling that in a sex-plus-marital status claim a female plaintiff must show that 
her male co-workers with the same marital status were treated differently, and reversing jury 
verdict for the plaintiff due to a lack of evidence on that point); Fisher v. Vassar Coll., 70 
F.3d 1420, 1446–47 (2d Cir. 1995) (rejecting sex-plus-marital status claim brought by 
female plaintiff in regards to her tenure denial because she “failed to present any evidence to 
show that married males who were up for tenure received ‘better, or even different 
treatment’”) (emphasis in original), aff’d en banc, 114 F.3d 1332 (2d Cir. 1997); Bryant v. 
Int’l Sch. Servs., Inc., 675 F.2d 562, 575 (3d Cir. 1982) (in rejecting a sex-plus-marital 
status claim, stating that “[t]o prove their prima facie case appellants’ must produce 
evidence that similarly situated males were treated differently and that there was no 
adequate nonsexual explanation for the different treatment”).  
 103 See Llana-Aday v. Dist. Bd. of Trustees of Miami-Dade Coll., No. 11–22825–CIV., 
2012 WL 5833612, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 16, 2012) (granting summary judgment to the 
defendant on female plaintiff’s sex-plus claim based on having children because the plaintiff 
failed to present evidence regarding an opposite sex comparator with the same child-rearing 
responsibilities); Cote v. Shinseki, No. 807-cv-1524-T-TBM., 2009 WL 1537901, at *14 
n.30 (M.D. Fla. June 2, 2009) (rejecting sex-plus claim and declaring that “gender-plus 
plaintiffs can never be successful if there is no corresponding subclass of members of the 
opposite gender [because] [s]uch plaintiffs cannot make the requisite showing that they were 
treated differently from similarly situated members of the opposite gender”) (emphasis in 
original) (quoting Coleman v. B–G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 108 F.3d 1199, 1204 (10th 
Cir. 1997)); Jordan v. Radiology Imaging Assocs., 577 F. Supp. 2d 771, 785 (D. Md. 2008) 
(finding the plaintiff failed to make out a prima facie case of sex-plus discrimination 
because she did not produce “evidence that women with children were treated differently 
from men with children”); Philipsen v. Univ. of Mich. Bd. of Regents, No. 06-CV-11977-
DT., 2007 WL 907822, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 22, 2007) (establishing that a same sex 
comparator evidence alone cannot prove discrimination on the basis of sex); Miller v. Grand 
Holdings, Inc., No. Civ.04–2688 ADM/AJB, 2005 WL 1745639, at *8 (D. Minn. July 26, 
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In one leading case, Coleman v. B-G Maintenance Management of 
Colorado, Inc., the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals declared that “gender-
plus plaintiffs can never be successful if there is no corresponding subclass 
of members of the opposite gender,” and consequently no evidence of how 
such opposite sex comparators were treated.104  Without such comparator 
evidence, the court declared, sex-plus “plaintiffs cannot make the requisite 
showing that they were treated differently from similarly situated members 
of the opposite gender,” a key component of any “sex” discrimination 
claim.105 
 
2005) (rejecting sex-plus-marital status claim brought by a female plaintiff because the 
plaintiff presented no evidence that “similarly situated men with children were treated more 
favorably.”); Witt v. Cty. Ins. & Fin. Servs., No. 04 C 3938, 2004 WL 2644397, at *3 (N.D. 
Ill. Nov. 18, 2004) (dismissing a female plaintiff’s sex-plus-marital status claim because she 
failed to present evidence of similarly-situated males who were treated differently by her 
employer); Hess-Watson v. Potter, No. Cic.A. 703CV00389, 2004 WL 34833, at *2 (W.D. 
Va. Jan. 4, 2004) (rejecting a female plaintiff’s claim alleging sex-plus discrimination due to 
having small children because she presented no evidence that males with small children 
were treated differently than women with small children; “[r]ather, she claims that the 
[employer favored] women without small children, but in the absence of a male comparator, 
this simply does not establish a viable ‘sex plus’ discrimination claim”); Longariello v. Sch. 
Bd. of Monroe Cty., Fla., 987 F. Supp. 1440, 1449 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (granting summary 
judgment to the defendant on a male plaintiff’s sex-plus-marital status claim, based on the 
fact that he was single, because he failed to provide any evidence of how his employer 
treated single women), aff’d sub nom. Longariello v. Sch. Bd., 161 F.3d 21 (11th Cir. 1998); 
Bass v. Chem. Banking Corp., No. 94 Civ. 8833 (SHS), 1996 WL 374151, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 
July 2, 1996) (rejecting a female plaintiff’s sex-plus-parental status or sex-plus-marital 
status claim based on a failure to promote because the plaintiff produced no evidence that 
her former employer “treated her differently than married men or men with children with 
regard to promotion” adding that promotion of a single woman with no children shows at 
most “discriminat[ion] against married persons or persons with children”).  Cf. King v. 
Ferguson Enters., Inc., 971 F. Supp. 2d 1200, 1214 (N.D. Ga. 2013) (stating that “when 
female plaintiffs alleging gender-plus discrimination point to a comparator to prove their 
prima facie case, they must show that the comparator is both male and has the relevant plus 
characteristic,” but recognizing that such comparator proof is not the only means of 
establishing a prima facie case) (emphasis in original), aff’d, 568 F. App’x 686 (11th Cir. 
2014); DeAngelo v. DentalEZ, Inc., 738 F. Supp. 2d 572, 585 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (stating that 
when a plaintiff alleges sex-plus-age discrimination against older women, the plaintiff “must 
present evidence that older men, the relevant comparator, were treated more favorably” such 
that “evidence regarding [the employer’s] alleged preference for hiring younger women is 
not on point for this claim” which instead pertains to an age discrimination claim); id. 
(noting further that despite a lack of opposite gender comparator evidence, a plaintiff “may 
still proceed on a sex-plus theory if she has direct record evidence of gender 
discrimination.”); Nesselrotte v. Allegheny Energy, Inc., No. 06–01390, 2009 WL 703395, 
at *11 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 16, 2009) (in a sex-plus-dependent children claim, requiring a female 
plaintiff to present evidence regarding the corresponding subclass of men, and rejecting the 
plaintiff’s attempt to raise an inference of sex discrimination with evidence that she was 
replaced by a woman without children); id. (noting that the plaintiff could rely on evidence, 
apart from a relevant male comparator, “of any other circumstances, such as impermissible 
stereotyping, that raise an inference of gender discrimination under Title VII”). 
 104  108 F.3d 1199, 1204 (10th Cir. 1997). 
 105  Id.   
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Coleman involved a female plaintiff, Stephanie Coleman, who was 
fired after one of the employees she supervised, her common-law husband, 
repeatedly left work during his shift.106  Thereafter, Coleman brought Title 
VII claims against her former employer for discrimination on the basis of 
sex and sex-plus-marital status.107  At trial, Coleman argued that the 
defendant had not terminated male supervisors whose subordinate 
employees had left work during their shifts.108  She did not, however, 
present evidence that any of  those male supervisors were married (or 
otherwise shared the same plus factor).109  Nevertheless, the jury rejected 
Coleman’s pure sex discrimination claim while ruling in her favor on her 
sex-plus-marital status claim, which the defendant appealed.110 
On appeal, the defendant argued that the jury’s verdict must be 
reversed because the district court’s jury instructions allowed the jury to  
rule for Coleman on her sex-plus claim without proof that she was treated 
differently than males with a similar marital status.111  The Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals agreed.112  As the Tenth Circuit declared, “Title VII 
prohibits employers from treating married women differently than married 
men, but it does not protect marital status alone.”113  Nevertheless, as to her 
sex-plus claim, the district court’s instructions failed to require proof that 
similarly situated males were treated differently, and thus allowed the jury 
to return a verdict for Coleman if marital status alone were the reason f or 
her termination.114  For this reason, the jury’s verdict had to be reversed.115 
Going one step further, the court then addressed the defendant’s 
argument that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Coleman’s 
sex-plus claim due to a complete lack of evidence to support that claim. 116  
Agreeing with the defendant, the court reiterated that the evidence merely 
showed that the defendant had not terminated male supervisors whose 
subordinate employees had left work during their shifts, but there was no 
evidence that any of those male supervisors “had any kind of personal 
 
 106  Coleman, 108 F.3d at 1202. 
 107  Id. at 1201.  The court referred to these two claims as discrimination on the basis of 
“gender” and “gender plus her marital status.”  For simplicity, this Article refers to those 
claims as “sex” and “sex-plus-marital status.”  
 108  Id. at 1202. 
 109  Id. at 1205. 
 110  Id. at 1202. 
 111  Id. at 1202–03.  The jury instruction at issue is quoted in footnote 1 of the court’s 
opinion.  See id. at 1202 n.1.  
 112  Coleman, 108 F.3d at 1203. 
 113  Id. at 1204. 
 114  Id.  
 115  Id. 
 116  Id. at 1205. 
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relationship, marital or otherwise, with their subordinate employees.”117  At 
most, then, Coleman’s evidence tended to prove pure sex discrimination, a 
claim the jury rejected, leaving Coleman with no viable discrimination 
claim.118 
Coleman effectively requires a sex-plus claim to be supported by 
opposite sex comparator evidence.119  Indeed, in one passage––often quoted 
by subsequent cases—the court declared that “gender-plus plaintiffs can 
never be successful if there is no corresponding subclass of members of the 
opposite gender” because, in that event, “[s]uch plaintiffs cannot make the 
requisite showing that they were treated differently from similarly situated 
members of the opposite gender.”120  Just as importantly, the Coleman 
court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that “[sex]-plus plaintiffs can 
compare themselves to all persons outside the corresponding subclass” to  
which the plaintiff belongs,121 thereby suggesting that same sex comparator 
evidence is insufficient to prove the requisite discriminatory treatment 
between the sexes.122  This point was more explicitly stated in  a Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals case, Fisher v. Vassar College.123 
In Fisher, plaintiff and biology professor, Cynthia Fisher, filed a sex-
plus-marital status discrimination suit against her former employer, Vassar 
College, after it denied her tenure.124  The evidence at trial focused on two 
issues: Fisher’s qualifications for tenure, and evidence of Vassar’s history 
of tenure decisions involving married women.125  As to the latter dispute, 
Fisher presented, among other evidence,126 statistical evidence purporting 
to show that no married female professor in the “hard” sciences had been 
granted tenure in the three decades before Fisher was denied tenure, 127 
 
 117  Id. 
 118  Coleman, 108 F.3d at 1205.  For these reasons, the court reversed the jury’s award of 
$250,000 damages to Coleman.  Id.  
 119  See id. at 1203 (stating that for a sex-plus claim, “the plaintiff must . . . prove that the 
subclass of women was unfavorably treated as compared to the corresponding subclass of 
men”).  See also id. at 1204. 
 120  Id. at 1204.  See also Longariello v. Sch. Bd. of Monroe Cty. Fla., 987 F. Supp. 
1440, 1449 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (quoting Coleman for the proposition that “[g]ender-plus 
plaintiffs can never be successful if there is no corresponding subclass of members of the 
opposite gender”), aff’d sub nom. Longariello v. Sch. Bd., 161 F.3d 21 (11th Cir. 1998).  
 121  See Coleman, 108 F.3d at 1204 (rejecting this argument). 
 122  See id. 
 123  70 F.3d 1420, 1446 (2d Cir. 1995), aff’d en banc, 114 F.3d 1332 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 124  Id. at 1426. 
 125  Id. 
 126  See id. at 1438 (explaining that Fisher’s evidence consisted not only of statistical 
evidence, but also anecdotes, perceived admissions by the decisionmakers in Fisher’s case, 
and expert testimony); id. at 1442 (noting that Fisher’s evidence “lean[ed] heavily on 
statistics”). 
 127  See id. at 1427 (finding the “hard” sciences to include mathematics, physics, 
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whereas the majority of single women in the hard sciences had been 
granted tenure during the same time period.128  In defense, Vassar pointed 
to the plaintiff’s lack of comparator evidence regarding how married males 
were treated, and presented its own data regarding its school-wide record of 
promoting women.129 
After a bench trial, the district court ruled in Fisher’s favor, directed 
Vassar to pay damages exceeding $600,000, and issued an order reinstating 
Fisher to her former position with a fresh opportunity to apply for tenure.130  
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding clear error in  the 
district court’s reliance on the plaintiff’s same sex statistics. 131  
Specifically, the court declared, Fisher “failed to present any evidence to  
show that married males who were up for tenure received better, or even 
different treatment.”132  This lack of opposite sex comparator evidence 
proved fatal to Fisher’s claim, because “[i]f Vassar was as unlikely to 
promote married men as it was to promote married women, then the only 
 
chemistry, geology, biology, and computer science, but not psychology); see also id. at 
1442–43 (describing the plaintiff’s statistical evidence in detail). 
 128  The plaintiff’s data included “59 female professors who were employed by Vassar at 
or above the rank of visiting assistant professor for two years or more in the departments of 
biology, chemistry, mathematics, physics, geology[,] and psychology at some point” 
between the years 1956 and 1985.  Id. at 1442.  “Of the 59 people, 19 already had tenure in 
1956.”  Id.  The plaintiff’s data separated the remaining forty individuals into categories 
based on whether they were single or non-single, and further indicated whether each 
individual was either “Promoted” (i.e., granted tenure) or “Terminated or left” (including 
professors who were either denied tenure or left Vassar for any reason).  Id.  Of those fourty 
individuals, fifteen were categorized as non-single; only one of those fifteen non-single 
persons (a psychology professor who the district court excluded from the hard sciences) was 
granted tenure.  Id. at 1443; see also id. at 1444 (concluding that the district court should 
have included psychology in the hard sciences).  The plaintiff’s data further showed that of 
the twenty-five single individuals, fourteen had been granted tenure.  Id.  See also Fisher v. 
Vassar Coll., 852 F. Supp. 1193, 1218 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (setting forth the district court’s 
findings on the tenure decisions for married and unmarried women in the hard sciences).   
 129  Fisher, 70 F.3d at 1426–27.  Fisher also presented evidence that the hard sciences 
had traditionally been composed of single women, as well as married and single men.  Id. at 
1427; Fisher, 852 F. Supp. at 1225–26.  Yet, Fisher’s statistics regarding tenure awards, 
which she “lean[ed] heavily on” in her attempt to establish that Vassar discriminated against 
married women, Fisher, 70 F.3d at 1442, focused on Vassar’s relative treatment of married 
and unmarried women.  Id. at 1443.  Thus, on appeal, the Second Circuit considered 
whether the district court clearly erred in finding sex-plus discrimination largely on the basis 
of Fisher’s same sex comparator statistics, which did not include evidence regarding the 
success of married males who were up for tenure.  See id. at 1443 (quoting district court’s 
findings based on Fisher’s statistics); id. at 1446.  See also id. at 1434 (explaining that the 
court would overturn the district court’s findings of fact only if clearly erroneous). 
 130  Fisher, 70 F.3d at 1426, 1431. 
 131  Id. at 1443. 
 132  Id. at 1447 (quoting Bryant v. Int’l Sch. Servs., Inc., 675 F.2d 562, 575 (3d Cir. 
1982)). 
MCALLIS TER (DO NO T DELETE)  1/9/2020   4:20 PM 
780 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:757 
thing one could say is that Vassar discriminated against married people,”133 
which is not unlawful under Title VII.134 
When a sex-plus plaintiff attempts to prove her case through 
comparator evidence, Fisher effectively requires opposite sex comparator 
evidence to prove the requisite sex discrimination.135  In the words of the 
Second Circuit, “[t]o establish that Vassar discriminated on the basis of sex 
plus marital status, [a] plaintiff [like Fisher] must show that married men 
were treated differently from married women.”136  “Absent this sex-to-sex 
comparison,” the court declared, “plaintiff’s [same sex comparator] 
statistics are meaningless.”137 
Like Fisher, various federal district courts have also rejected sex-plus 
claims unsupported by opposite sex comparator evidence.  In one case, Fox 
v. Brown Memorial Home, Inc.,138 the plaintiff alleged that she was fired 
from her job due to her marriage to a man who also worked for the 
employer, such that her firing was based upon her sex-plus-marital 
status.139  In reviewing her claim, the United States District Court f or the 
Southern District of Ohio—quoting from a Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 
case—declared that in a sex-plus case, “a female plaintiff must  .  .  .  prove 
that the subclass of women was unfavorably treated as compared to the 
corresponding subclass of men ,”140 adding that “[a]bsent such a 
corresponding subclass of men, a plaintiff cannot establish sex 
discrimination.”141  In Fox, the plaintiff failed to allege that a subclass of 
women was treated unfavorably compared to a subclass of men.142  For this 
reason, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s sex-plus claim.143 
 
 133  Id. 
 134  Id.  See also King v. Ferguson Enters., Inc., 971 F. Supp. 2d 1200, 1215 (N.D. Ga. 
2013) (noting that “if a woman [claiming sex-plus discrimination] cannot show that her 
employer treats the same subclass of men differently, then gender is not a factor; moreover, 
allowing her claim without such evidence would result in the protection of the characteristic 
rather than gender”), aff’d, 568 F. App’x 686 (11th Cir. 2014). 
 135  See Fisher, 70 F.3d at 1446–47.  But see id. at 1447 n.12 (recognizing that when “the 
complainant establishes by evidence that there are no [similarly situated] males [with the 
same plus factor at issue] and that it is unlikely that there would be any, then it may be that 
the complainant would be able to prevail by providing some other evidence of 
discrimination”).   
 136  Id. at 1446 (emphasis in original). 
 137  Id.   
 138  No. 2:09-cv-915, 2010 WL 3167849 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 10, 2010). 
 139  See id. at *1–2. 
 140  Id. at *2 (quoting Derungs v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 374 F.3d 428, 432 (6th Cir. 
2004)) (internal marks omitted) (emphasis in original). 
 141  Id. at *2 (quoting Derungs v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 374 F.3d 428, 432 (6th Cir. 
2004)) (internal marks omitted) (emphasis in original).   
 142  Id. at *3. 
 143  See id. (stating that “[b]ecause the Complaint does not allege the existence of a 
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In another similar case, Fuller v. GTE Corp./Contel Cellular, Inc. ,144 
the plaintiff alleged that her former employer violated Title VII by 
discriminating against her because of her sex combined with her status as a 
mother of young children.145  Similar to Fox, the Fuller court rejected the 
plaintiff’s sex-plus claim because the plaintiff “failed to  show”—and did 
not even allege in her complaint—“that she was treated differently” than 
men with young children.146  For sex-plus claims of the type alleged in 
Fuller, the court declared that a plaintiff must present “evidence to  show 
that fathers of young children received better or even different 
treatment.”147  Here, however, the plaintiff offered no evidence that her 
employer “would have treated her any differently had she been a father and 
everything else had remained the same.”148  Without the requisite opposite 
sex comparator evidence, the court rejected the plaintiff’s sex-plus claim.149 
V. COMPARATOR EVIDENCE IN SEX-PLUS CASES: COURTS THAT 
RECOGNIZE THE RELEVANCE OF SAME SEX COMPARATOR EVIDENCE IN 
PROVING SEX-PLUS DISCRIMINATION 
In contrast to the cases described in the previous section, which 
generally require opposite sex comparator evidence to prove sex-plus 
discrimination claims while finding little to no evidentiary value in  same 
sex comparator evidence, other cases have relied heavily on same sex 
comparator evidence, at times validating sex-plus claims even without 
opposite sex comparator proof.150  Cases in this line include two opinions 
from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
 
similarly situated male subclass, [the plaintiff] cannot demonstrate that she was a victim of 
sex discrimination under Title VII”). 
 144  926 F. Supp. 653 (M.D. Tenn. 1996). 
 145  Id. at 656. 
 146  Id. at 657. 
 147  Id. at 658. 
 148  Id. at 657 (emphasis in original).  The court also found it significant that the plaintiff 
was replaced by another female with children, id., which seems particularly important in 
light of the court’s iteration of the final requirement of the plaintiff’s prima facie case—
namely, that the plaintiff “was replaced by someone outside of the protected class,” id. at 
656.   
 149  Id. at 657. 
 150  To be clear, rather than rejecting same sex comparator evidence outright, courts in 
cases like Fisher and Philipsen often simply declare that in the absence of opposite gender 
comparator evidence, same sex comparator evidence alone cannot prove discrimination on 
the basis of sex.  See Philipsen v. Univ. of Mich. Bd. of Regents, No. 06-CV-11977-DT, 
2007 WL 907822, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 22, 2007) (establishing that same sex comparator 
evidence alone cannot prove discrimination on the basis of sex); Fisher v. Vassar Coll., 70 
F.3d 1420, 1446 (2d Cir. 1995) (describing the plaintiff’s statistics comparing the 
employer’s treatment of married versus unmarried women as “meaningless” absent a 
statistically sound “sex-to-sex comparison”), aff’d en banc, 114 F.3d 1332 (2d Cir. 1997). 
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Pennsylvania, Arnett v. Aspin,151 and McGrenaghan v. St. Denis School ;152 
another District Court opinion from New York, Trezza v. Hartford, Inc. ;153 
and Back v. Hastings On Hudson Union Free School Dist. ,154 a Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals case. 
In Arnett v. Aspin, Judge Lowell E. Reed, Jr., of the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, recognized a sex -
plus-age discrimination claim under Title VII based upon discrimination 
against the subgroup of women over the age of forty.155  There, forty-nine-
year old plaintiff, Mary Arnett, alleged that she was discriminated against 
by her employer because she was a female over the age of f orty. 156  To 
support her claim, Arnett presented evidence that two women younger than 
thirty were hired over her for the position of equal employment 
specialist.157  She also claimed, and the defendants admitted, that all of the 
defendants’ equal employment specialists had been either women under 
forty or men over forty.158 
Arguing primarily that Title VII does not authorize sex-plus-age 
claims, the defendants moved for summary judgment, which Judge Reed 
denied.159  Although Judge Reed’s opinion focuses on explaining why sex-
plus-age claims are valid under Title VII,160 an issue that remains 
unsettled,161 Judge Reed’s analysis of the merits of Arnett’s claim explicitly 
invokes both opposite sex and same sex comparator evidence.  Regarding 
opposite sex comparator evidence, Judge Reed found that “the defendants 
discriminated against [Arnett] on the basis of her sex . . . [by] requir[ing] 
more of her than they did of the male applicants for the position of equal 
employment specialist.  That is, they required that she be under the age of 
forty.”162  Highlighting Arnett’s same sex comparator evidence, Judge Reed 
further declared that Arnett had shown a prima facie case of discrimination 
because: (1) she was a member of a protected subclass consisting of 
 
 151  Arnett v. Aspin, 846 F. Supp. 1234, 1239 (E.D. Pa. 1994). 
 152  McGrenaghan v. St. Denis Sch., 979 F. Supp. 323 (E.D. Pa. 1997). 
 153  Trezza v. Hartford, Inc., No. 98 CIV. 2205 (MBM), 1998 WL 912101 (S.D.N.Y. 
Dec. 30, 1998). 
 154  Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch., Dist., 365 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 155  Arnett, 846 F. Supp. at 1240. 
 156  Id. at 1236. 
 157  Id.  
 158  Id. at 1236−37. 
 159  See id. at 1237 (explaining that the defendants only sought summary judgment in 
their favor with respect to the second count of Arnett’s complaint, which alleged sex-plus-
age discrimination under Title VII). 
 160  See id. at 1240−41 & n.8. 
 161  See Marc Chase McAllister, Extending the Sex Plus Discrimination Doctrine to Age 
Discrimination Claims, 60 B.C. L. REV. 469, 487−92 (2019). 
 162  See Arnett, 846 F. Supp. at 1240 (emphasis added). 
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women over forty; (2) she was qualified for and applied for the positions in 
question; (3) she was denied the positions, despite her qualifications; and 
(4) other employees outside her protected “class”163 or “discrete 
subclass”164 were selected, “in this case two women under 40.”165 
Notably, Arnett is similar to Fisher, in that both plaintiffs presented 
evidence that the position they sought—equal employment specialist in 
Arnett, and a tenured faculty position in the hard sciences in  Fisher—had 
been filled only with women lacking the plus factor at issue,166 and, at least 
to some extent, opposite sex comparators possessing the same-plus 
characteristic.167  Likewise, both plaintiffs presented evidence that not a 
single sex-plus woman had previously obtained the position at issue during 
the relevant time frame.168  The Fisher court, however, overturned 
judgment in the plaintiff’s favor due to a perceived lack of opposite sex 
comparator evidence, whereas the Arnett court denied summary judgment 
to the defendant based on similar evidence,169 after which the Arnett parties 
apparently settled the case.170  Accordingly, although the procedural 
posture of each case differs, the cases are in tension with respect to the type 
of comparator evidence sufficient to support a sex-plus claim. 
A few years after Arnett, the same court recognized a sex-plus claim 
in McGrenaghan v. St. Denis School,171 despite the total absence of 
opposite sex comparator evidence.  In that case, plaintiff Sarah 
McGrenaghan sued defendants, the St. Denis School and Archdiocese of 
Philadelphia, “for allegedly removing her f rom a full-time teaching 
position and refusing to rehire her to the position solely on the basis of” 
having a disabled child.172  The defendants sought summary judgment on 
McGrenaghan’s sex discrimination claim, arguing that she had failed to 
 
 163  See id. at 1239 (stating that “[f]or purposes of determining whether there was 
disparate treatment [in a sex-plus case], the plaintiff’s class is defined as a subclass of 
women, for example, women with preschool children”). 
 164  See id. at 1241 (stating that “[f]or purposes of determining whether the defendants’ 
discriminated against Arnett in violation of Title VII, I find she is a member of a discrete 
subclass of ‘women over forty’”). 
 165  Id. 
 166  Fisher v. Vassar Coll., 70 F.3d 1420, 1442–43 (2d Cir. 1995), aff’d en banc, 114 
F.3d 1332 (2d Cir. 1997); Arnett, 846 F. Supp. at 1236–37. 
 167  Fisher, 70 F.3d at 1427; Arnett, 846 F. Supp. at 1236–37. 
 168  Fisher, 70 F.3d at 1427, 1442–43; Arnett, 846 F. Supp. at 1236–37. 
 169  Fisher, 70 F.3d at 1448; Arnett, 846 F. Supp. at 1240–41 & n.7.   
 170  The assumption that the parties settled the case is based on the author’s review of the 
case docket, which includes an order dismissing the case with prejudice signed within a few 
days after trial was scheduled to begin in the case, with no indication in the docket that trial 
actually commenced.  See Order Dismissing Action with Prejudice, Arnett v. Aspin, Civ. A. 
No. 93–2065 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 1, 1995), ECF No. 28. 
 171  McGrenaghan v. St. Denis Sch., 979 F. Supp. 323, 323 (E.D. Pa. 1997).  
 172  Id. at 325. 
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produce evidence that she was treated less favorably on the basis of her 
gender because (a) the person ultimately selected over her was also a 
woman,173 and (b) she had no proof that the defendants treated males more 
favorably than females.174 
In finding “ample evidence to establish a prima f acie case of ‘sex-
plus’ gender discrimination” against McGrenaghan’s particular subclass of 
“women who have children with disabilities,”175 the court pointed to  two 
items of evidence, neither of which involved opposite sex comparator 
evidence.176  First, the court pointed to same sex comparator evidence by 
noting that the person selected over the plaintiff was a less qualified female 
who was “not the mother of a disabled child and therefore, not a member of 
the subclass of women with disabled children.”177  Second, the court 
pointed to direct evidence of discriminatory animus against working 
mothers and mothers with disabled children, including discriminatory 
statements made by the school’s principal.178  The court thus rejected the 
defendant’s argument that it could not be liable for sex discrimination on 
the basis that the person hired for the position was also a woman.179 
As McGrenaghan shows, opposite sex comparator evidence is not 
always required to raise an inference of sex-plus discrimination, 
particularly where the plaintiff produces direct evidence of discriminatory 
animus against her particular subgroup in combination with same sex 
comparator evidence.  Another similar district court decision, Trezza v. 
Hartford, Inc.,180 further illustrates the relevance of same sex comparator 
evidence in proving sex-plus claims. 
In Trezza, the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
New York considered a sex-plus claim brought by Joann Trezza, a woman 
with two young children, based on allegations that her employer denied her 
 
 173  Id. at 326. 
 174  Id. 
 175  See id. at 327. 
 176  Id.  Immediately before describing the “ample evidence” supporting the plaintiff’s 
claim of sex-plus discrimination, the court also stated that the “plaintiff alleges . . . that 
similar employment decisions would not have been made of a woman without a disabled 
child or a father of a disabled child.”  Id.  Although this statement seemingly points to 
opposite gender comparator evidence, the statement appears to be nothing more than a 
description of the plaintiff’s allegations in the case, as it was made without citing any 
evidence, which would be expected in an opinion denying summary judgment. 
 177  McGrenaghan v. St. Denis Sch., 979 F. Supp. 323, 327 (E.D. Pa. 1997).  
 178  Id.  The court did not identify the particular discriminatory statements made by the 
school’s principal.   
 179  Id.  Accordingly, the court denied summary judgment to the defendant on the 
plaintiff’s sex discrimination claim.  Id. 
 180  Trezza v. Hartford, Inc., No. 98 CIV. 2205 (MBM), 1998 WL 912101 (S.D.N.Y. 
Dec. 30, 1998). 
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promotions in favor of either women without children or men with 
children.181  With respect to one promotion, which was awarded to a 
woman without children, the defendant argued that Trezza’s sex-plus claim 
should be dismissed because another woman received the promotion, such 
that there could be no sex discrimination.182  The court promptly rejected 
this attempt to use same sex comparator evidence defensively,183 noting that 
the Supreme Court in Phillips had foreclosed this argument.184  Thus, rather 
than defeating Trezza’s sex-plus discrimination claim, the court declared 
that the employer’s rejection of Trezza in favor of another woman without 
the relevant plus characteristic actually helped establish a prima facie case 
of discrimination,185 which was further established through allegations that 
her employer had treated men with children and women with children 
differently in regards to promotions.186  Thus, the combination of both 
same sex and opposite sex comparator evidence proved critical to the 
plaintiff’s sex-plus claim (at least in the context of defending a motion to  
dismiss). 
Finally, in a decision directly rejecting the view that sex-plus claims 
must be supported by opposite sex comparator evidence (albeit under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, rather than Title VII187), the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals found that a sex-plus plaintiff could prove her case through 
stereotyped remarks about the employment abilities of women with 
children, without presenting any opposite sex comparator evidence.188 
 
 181  See id. at *1–2 (describing three incidents where the plaintiff failed to earn a 
promotion, which was instead awarded to either women without children or men with 
children). 
 182  Id. at *5.   
 183  Id. at *6 (stating that “[w]hen a plaintiff alleges discrimination on the basis of sex in 
conjunction with some other characteristic, the defendant’s selection of someone of the 
same sex as plaintiff but without the added characteristic . . . . [may not be used to] defeat an 
otherwise legitimate inference of discrimination—the essence of a plaintiff’s prima facie 
case”). 
 184  See id. (stating “the point of Phillips and its progeny is that a defendant should not be 
able to escape liability for discrimination on the basis of sex merely by hiring some 
members of the protected group”). 
 185  See id. (declaring that “[t]his court is not the first to conclude that a plaintiff in a sex-
plus discrimination case can establish a prima [facie] case of discrimination where she was 
rejected in favor of a member of the same sex without the relevant additional 
characteristic”). 
 186  Id. at *7.   
 187  See Back v. Hastings On Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 118–19 (2d 
Cir. 2004) (finding that “sex plus” discrimination is actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
because “the Equal Protection Clause forbids sex discrimination no matter how it is 
labeled,” such that “[t]he relevant issue is . . . whether the plaintiff provides evidence of 
purposefully sex-discriminatory acts”). 
 188  See id. at 118–22.  See also id. at 113 (stating the issue in the case as “whether 
stereotyping about the qualities of mothers is a form of gender discrimination, and whether 
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In that case, the Second Circuit considered a discrimination claim 
brought by school psychologist, Elana Back, after she was denied tenure 
due to an alleged stereotypical view that young mothers could not balance 
both work and home obligations.189  In reversing the lower court’s grant of 
summary judgment to the individuals instrumental in denying Back tenure, 
the Second Circuit relied primarily on statements made by those 
individuals that stereotyped her “as a woman and mother of young 
children,” which showed that they “treated her differently than they would 
have treated a man and father of young children.”190  These stereotyped 
remarks included a statement that a woman “cannot ‘be a good mother’” 
while holding a job that requires long hours and a statement that a mother 
who was awarded tenure “would not show the same level of commitment 
[she] had shown [before earning tenure] because [she] had little ones at 
home.”191  These and similar remarks, according to the court, demonstrated 
that the decisionmakers had denied Back tenure based on stereotyped 
generalizations regarding the inability of women with children to combine 
work and motherhood, rather than because of Back’s actual qualifications, 
evidence that was alone enough to avoid summary judgment.192 
Just as importantly, the Back court rejected the defendants’ argument 
that opposite sex comparator evidence is required to prove a sex-plus 
discrimination claim.  In one passage, for example, the court described the 
issue in the case as “whether stereotyping about the qualities of mothers is 
a form of gender discrimination, and whether this can be determined in the 
absence of evidence about how the employer in question treated 
fathers[,]”193 in other words, in the absence of opposite sex comparato r 
evidence.  The court “answer[ed] both questions in the affirmative.” 194  
Later, the court again rejected the defendants’ argument that stereotypes 
about pregnant women or mothers cannot be presumed to be on the basis of 
sex “without comparative evidence of what was said about fathers.”195  The 
court declared the defendants to be “wrong in their contention that [a 
 
this can be determined in the absence of evidence about how the employer in question 
treated fathers,” and “answer[ing] both questions in the affirmative”). 
 189  See id.  See also id. at 115 (describing the alleged stereotyping behavior).  Notably, 
Back brought her sex discrimination claim under the Equal Protection Clause, which the 
court found to encompass sex plus claims.  See id. at 118–19. 
 190  See id. at 124, 130 (analyzing the evidence of discriminatory motives and comments 
of the plaintiff’s supervisors, Brennan and Wishnie). 
 191  Id. at 120.  See also id. at 115 (summarizing a host of seemingly discriminatory 
statements). 
 192  See id. at 120.  Notably, the court denied summary judgment only to the actual 
decisionmakers in Back’s case.  See id. at 113. 
 193  Back, 365 F.3d at 113.   
 194  Id. 
 195  Id. at 121. 
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plaintiff like] Back cannot make out a claim that survives summary 
judgment unless she demonstrates that the defendants treated similarly 
situated men differently.”196  Thus, although Back had “proffered no 
evidence about the treatment of male administrators with young children,” 
this was not fatal to her claim, as “there is no requirement that such 
evidence be adduced.”197  Rather, what matters is “the [employer’s] reasons 
for the individual plaintiff’s treatment,”198 evidenced by the employer’s 
“stereotypical remarks about the incompatibility of motherhood and 
employment.”199  Accordingly, the court declared, “stereotyping of women 
as caregivers can by itself and without more be evidence of an 
impermissible, sex-based motive.”200 
VI. PROPOSALS 
As the previous two sections have shown, courts disagree as to 
whether opposite sex comparator evidence is required to prove a sex -plus 
discrimination claim.201  On the one hand, cases like Coleman declare that 
“gender-plus plaintiffs can never be successful if there is no corresponding 
subclass of members of the opposite gender” because, in that event, such 
plaintiffs “cannot make the requisite showing that they were treated 
differently from similarly situated members of the opposite gender,” a 
necessary component of any sex discrimination claim.202  On the other 
hand, cases like Back have openly rejected the purported opposite sex 
comparator requirement, finding instead that the requisite discriminatory 
intent can be proven in other ways.203  This section resolves this dispute, 
and more broadly delineates the proper role for comparator evidence in  
sex-plus cases. 
 
 
 196  Id. 
 197  Id. 
 198  Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 
2001)).  
 199  Back, 365 F.3d at 122. 
 200  Id. at 122.  Later still, the court reiterated this point when discussing the 
requirements of the McDonnell Douglas test.  See id. at 124 (“[A]s with the first stage of 
McDonnell Douglas, Back is not required to provide evidence that similarly situated men 
were treated differently[.]”). 
 201  See Gee-Thomas v. Cingular Wireless, 324 F. Supp. 2d 875, 884 n.6 (M.D. Tenn. 
2004). 
 202  Coleman v. B–G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 108 F.3d 1199, 1204 (10th Cir. 1997). 
 203  Back, 365 F.3d at 121.  Likewise, cases like Fisher have noted that when no opposite 
sex comparator exists in a given workforce, a sex-plus plaintiff may instead provide “some 
other evidence of discrimination” beyond comparator proof.  See Fisher v. Vassar Coll., 70 
F.3d 1420, 1447 n.12 (2d Cir. 1995), aff’d en banc, 114 F.3d 1332 (2d Cir. 1997). 
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A. The Proper Role of Comparator Evidence in Sex-Plus 
Discrimination Cases 
This subsection presents a series of proposals regarding the role of 
opposite sex and same sex comparator evidence in proving sex-plus 
discrimination.  The subsection to follow examines other means of proving 
sex-plus discrimination beyond comparator proof. 
First, this Article contends that opposite sex comparator evidence is 
indeed essential in cases where a plaintiff attempts to prove sex-plus 
discrimination solely through comparator evidence.  As noted, opposite sex 
comparator evidence focuses on the employer’s treatment of a person of the 
opposite sex as the plaintiff who shares the same plus characteristic.  
Opposite sex comparator evidence would include, for example, evidence 
that an employer refuses to hire women with children (the plaintiff) ,  but 
routinely hires men with children (the opposite sex comparator).  As cases 
like Coleman,204 Fisher,205 and Fuller206 suggest, such comparator evidence 
is required—at least in cases where a plaintiff attempts to prove sex-plus 
discrimination through comparator evidence—because evidence regarding 
an employer’s more favorable treatment of an opposite sex comparator is 
needed to prove that the plaintiff’s sex played a factor in  the employer’s 
decision.207  After all, Title VII does not prohibit discrimination on the 
basis of an innocuous plus factor, such as marital status, but this would be 
the only inference that would arise in a case where a married woman relies 
exclusively on evidence showing only that she was treated less favorably 
than unmarried women.208  Moreover, courts have routinely determined, 
based on the plain text of Title VII, that there can be no actionable claim of 
sex discrimination, which includes sex-plus allegations, without proof that 
members of one sex were treated less favorably or subject to  different 
employment standards than members of the opposite sex. 209  As such, 
 
 204  See Coleman, 108 F.3d at 1203–04. 
 205  See Fisher, 70 F.3d at 1447. 
 206  See Fuller v. GTE Corp./Contel Cellular, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 653, 657–58 (M.D. 
Tenn. 1996). 
 207  See Fisher, 70 F.3d at 1446 (rejecting sex-plus claim for lack of opposite gender 
comparator evidence and stating that “[t]o establish that Vassar discriminated on the basis of 
sex plus marital status, plaintiff must show that married men were treated differently from 
married women”) (emphasis in original), aff’d en banc, 114 F.3d 1332 (2d Cir. 1997); 
Carson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 82 F.3d 157, 158 (7th Cir. 1996) (“The central question in 
any employment-discrimination case is whether the employer would have taken the same 
action had the employee been of a different race (age, sex, religion, national origin, etc.) and 
everything else had remained the same.”).  
 208  See Fisher, 70 F.3d at 1447. 
 209  See, e.g., Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (declaring that 
Title VII “requires that persons of like qualifications be given employment opportunities 
irrespective of their sex,” such that the statute does not permit “one hiring policy for women 
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opposite sex comparator evidence is a necessary component of any sex-
plus discrimination claim proven through comparator evidence. 
Fisher provides a helpful illustration.  In that case, professor Cynthia 
Fisher sued her former employer, Vassar College, for sex-plus-marital 
status discrimination for having denied her tenure.210  At trial, Fisher 
presented statistical evidence purporting to show that no married female 
professor in the hard sciences had been granted tenure in the three decades 
before Fisher was denied tenure, whereas the majority of single women in 
the hard sciences had been granted tenure during the same time period.211  
Assuming the truth of these allegations, and without any comparator 
evidence regarding how married males were treated, the only thing Fisher’s 
data would prove is that Vassar College discriminated against professors on 
the basis of marital status.212  But  discrimination on the basis of marital 
status is not, in and of itself, prohibited by Title VII. 213  Accordingly, in  
order to prove sex discrimination through comparator evidence, plaintiffs 
like Fisher must present evidence showing that similarly-situated males are 
treated differently.214  As the Fisher court declared, “[a]bsent this sex -to-
sex comparison on a statistically sound basis, plaintiff’s [same sex 
comparator evidence is] meaningless.”215 
For similar reasons, this Article further contends that same sex 
comparator evidence alone cannot raise an inference of sex discrimination, 
because same sex comparator evidence, by itself, cannot generate any 
inference of sex discrimination.216  This point is made clear in Philipsen v. 
 
and another for men”); King v. Ferguson Enters., Inc., 971 F. Supp. 2d 1200, 1209 (N.D. 
Ga. 2013) (“Despite its name, the ultimate question in these cases ‘is whether the employer 
took an adverse employment action at least in part because of an employee’s sex.’”), aff’d, 
568 F. App’x 686 (11th Cir. 2014); DeAngelo v. DentalEZ, Inc., 738 F. Supp. 2d 572, 584 
(E.D. Pa. 2010) (recognizing that, “[a]t its root, . . . ‘sex-plus’ discrimination is simply a 
form of gender discrimination,” requiring the plaintiff to present sufficient evidence of sex 
discrimination).   
 210  Fisher, 70 F.3d at 1426. 
 211  See supra note 129. 
 212  Fisher, 70 F.3d at 1447. 
 213  Id.  See also King, 971 F. Supp. 2d at 1215 (“[I]f a woman [claiming sex-plus 
discrimination] cannot show that her employer treats the same subclass of men differently, 
then gender is not a factor; moreover, allowing her claim without such evidence would 
result in the protection of the characteristic rather than gender.”); Chadwick v. WellPoint, 
Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 43 (1st Cir. 2009) (recognizing that Title VII prohibits discrimination 
based on sex, but “does not prohibit discrimination based on caregiving responsibility”). 
 214  See Fisher, 70 F.3d at 1446–47.   
 215  Id. at 1446.   
 216  See id. at 1446–47.  See also Coleman v. B–G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 108 F.3d 
1199, 1202–05 (10th Cir. 1997) (in sex-plus-marital status claim, ruling that a female 
plaintiff must show that her male co-workers with the same marital status were treated 
differently, and reversing jury verdict for the plaintiff due to a lack of evidence on that 
point). 
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University of Michigan Board of Regents, which rejected the plaintiff’s 
claim that her job offer was rescinded based on her sex and parental status 
as a mother with young children.217  Applying the McDonnell Douglas 
test,218 the defendant argued that plaintiff could not establish a prima f acie 
case of sex-plus discrimination because she had failed to identify male 
employees with young children who were treated differently—in other 
words, she had failed to produce opposite sex comparator evidence.219  In  
response, the plaintiff argued that she had satisfied her burden by showing 
that women in her workplace were treated differently depending on 
whether they had children—in other words, that same sex comparator 
evidence would suffice.220  The court agreed with the defendant,221 adding 
that accepting the plaintiff’s argument “would  turn this gender 
discrimination case into a parental discrimination case,” which is not 
unlawful under federal law.222 
In sum, when a plaintiff attempts to prove sex-plus discrimination 
through comparator evidence, it is not enough to point to same sex 
comparator evidence without also providing evidence of how similarly 
situated persons of the opposite sex were treated. 223  Although same sex 
comparator evidence has an important role to play in sex-plus claims and 
can appear persuasive, given its ability to expose discrimination against a 
particular subgroup of males or females, such evidence is simply not 
capable, in and of itself, of demonstrating the requisite sex 
 
 217  Philipsen v. Univ. of Mich. Bd. of Regents, No. 06-CV-11977-DT, 2007 WL 907822 
(E.D. Mich. Mar. 22, 2007). 
 218  The Philipsen court first considered whether the plaintiff could prove her case with 
direct evidence of discrimination.  The plaintiff, who disclosed during her interview that she 
was the mother of two young children, id. at *1, argued that the following statement made 
by one of her interviewers constituted direct evidence of discrimination: “I’ve got an offer 
for you.  Before I give it to you, I have a question . . . Are you sure you don’t want to stay at 
home to be with your children.”  Id. at *2, *5.  The court found this statement, although 
“perhaps not . . . appropriate,” was not direct evidence of discrimination, as “it does not 
necessarily evince a discriminatory intent,” “does not require the conclusion, without any 
additional inferences, that [d]efendant discriminated against [p]laintiff on the basis of her 
status was a mother with young children,” and “does not compel a reasonable factfinder to 
conclude that [p]laintiff’s job offer was rescinded [several days later] for discriminatory 
reasons.”  Id. at *5. 
 219  Id. at *6. 
 220  Id. 
 221  See id. (noting that both parties cited cases supporting their respective positions, but 
that “the court is more persuaded by those that require the comparator to be outside of the 
protected class”).   
 222  Id. at *8. 
 223  See Fisher v. Vassar Coll., 70 F.3d at 1446 (2d Cir. 1995) (calling the plaintiff’s 
same sex comparator evidence “meaningless” in the absence of opposite gender comparator 
evidence), aff’d en banc, 114 F.3d 1332 (2d Cir. 1997). 
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discrimination.224 
This is not to suggest, however, that same sex comparator evidence is 
not relevant in proving sex-plus discrimination.  Indeed, when paired with 
opposite sex comparator evidence, same sex comparator evidence reveals 
that the employer does not engage in sex discrimination across-the-board, 
but rather employs a more specific sex-based animus targeting only a 
particular subgroup of male or female employees, thereby establishing the 
claim as a sex-plus claim rather than a pure sex discrimination claim. 225  
For this reason, this Article contends that the strongest sex-plus 
discrimination claims are those where the two types of comparator 
evidence are used in tandem. 
Take, for example, the facts of Lam v. University of Hawaii, a case in  
which the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recognized 
a Title VII sex-plus-race claim brought by an Asian woman of Vietnamese 
descent.226  In that case, Maivan Clech Lam sued the University of 
Hawaii’s Law School claiming that it discriminated against her on the basis 
of her race and sex when it twice rejected her application for a faculty 
position.227  After Lam lost at trial, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
found it erroneous for the district court to have relied on the defendants’ 
favorable treatment of two other candidates for the faculty position at issue: 
one an Asian man (tending to defeat a claim of pure race discrimination), 
and the other a white woman (tending to defeat a claim of pure sex 
discrimination).228  According to the Ninth Circuit, the district court 
apparently viewed racism and sexism as “distinct elements amenable to  
almost mathematical treatment, so that evaluating discrimination against an 
Asian woman became a simple matter of performing two separate tasks: 
looking for racism ‘alone’ and looking for sexism ‘alone,’ with Asian men 
and white women as the corresponding model victims.”229  This slicing and 
dicing of Lam’s plus discrimination claim, according to the Ninth Circuit,  
failed to account for the fact that “Asian women are subject to a set of 
stereotypes and assumptions shared neither by Asian men nor by white 
women,”230 such that Asian women may be targeted for discrimination 
 
 224  See Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., 561 F.3d at 43 (1st Cir. 2009) (in a sex-plus case, 
declaring that “regardless of the label given to the claim, the simple question posed by sex 
discrimination suits is whether the employer took an adverse employment action at least in 
part because of an employee’s sex”). 
 225  Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971).   
 226  Lam v. Univ. of Haw., 40 F.3d 1551, 1561–62, n.16. 
 227  Id. at 1554.  Lam also alleged national origin discrimination, id. at 1554, but the 
Ninth Circuit focused on her allegations of race and sex discrimination, id. at 1559–60. 
 228  Id. at 1561. 
 229  Id.  
 230  Here, the court noted in a footnote that Asian women are subject to particular 
MCALLIS TER (DO NO T DELETE)  1/9/2020   4:20 PM 
792 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:757 
“even in the absence of discrimination against [Asian] men or white 
women.”231  Accordingly, the court determined that “when a plaintiff is 
claiming race and sex bias, it is necessary to determine whether the 
employer discriminates on the basis of that combination of factors, not just 
whether it discriminates against people of the same race or of the same 
sex.”232 
In sex-plus terms, Lam claimed that she belonged to a particular 
subgroup of women, those who are Asian, that were the target of the 
defendant’s unique discriminatory animus.  To prove the alleged bias, a 
plaintiff like Lam could invoke both opposite sex and same sex comparator 
evidence.  Regarding opposite sex comparator evidence, Lam might present 
evidence that the defendant refused to hire Asian women, but had no such 
policy with respect to the relevant opposite sex comparator sharing the 
same plus factor as Lam: men who are Asian.  Regarding same sex 
comparator evidence, Lam might present additional evidence that the 
defendant readily hired the same sex comparator lacking the relevant plus 
factor pertaining to Lam’s race, including the subgroup of women who are 
Caucasian.  After all, it is this combination of evidence that best proves 
discrimination against the subgroup of women who are Asian, as opposed 
to women on the whole.  Accordingly, while the Lam defendant had 
attempted to use both types of comparator evidence defensively, the lesson 
of Lam is that such evidence can instead be used offensively, as a means of 
proving the defendant’s discriminatory intent against the particular 
subgroup of women at issue: Asian women.  And importantly, this analysis 
is not unique to “plus” factors involving immutable characteristics, as this 
same analysis can be applied to the sex-plus cases outlined above with 
“plus” factors involving fundamental rights, including Phillips,233 
McGrenaghan,234 and Trezza.235 
To be sure, the evidentiary function of same sex comparator 
evidence—exposing an instance of discrimination against only a particular 
subgroup women—might appear to overlap with that of opposite sex 
comparator evidence, making same sex comparator evidence redundant and 
unnecessary.  Under the facts of Lam, for example, if evidence shows that 
the defendant-employer does not hire Asian women, but hires Asian men, 
that evidence might both prove that sex discrimination had occurred 
 
stereotypes such as geisha, dragon lady, concubine, and lotus blossom.  Id. at 1562 n.21. 
 231  Id. at 1562 (quoting Jefferies v. Harris Cty. Cmty. Action Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025, 
1032 (5th Cir. 1980)). 
 232  Id. at 1562 (emphasis in original).  
 233  See supra notes 72–75 and accompanying text. 
 234  See supra notes 76–78 and accompanying text. 
 235  See supra notes 180–186 and accompanying text. 
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(because, in the words of Phillips, the employer is utilizing “one hiring 
policy for women and another for men”),236 and suggest that the 
discrimination is occurring at the subgroup level (because the comparison 
being made is between Asian women and Asian men, rather than women 
and men on the whole).  In this respect, same sex comparator evidence, 
which performs the evidentiary function of exposing discrimination at the 
subgroup level, might appear duplicative and therefore unnecessary.  But 
this is incorrect.  Sticking with the facts of Lam, a simple comparison of the 
hiring policies between Asian women and Asian men does not indicate, 
either way, whether all other women and all other men are likewise subject 
to the same hiring policies.  Depending on other evidence, it could be that 
this employer does not hire only Asian women, or that this employer does 
not hire women at all, or even that this employer does not hire Asian and 
Hispanic women.  More evidence is needed to know exactly what claim a 
plaintiff like Lam should pursue: pure sex discrimination, or sex-plus 
discrimination.  Same sex comparator evidence provides the missing link, 
because if it turns out that this employer readily hires women who are not 
Asian, then the proper claim becomes sex-plus-race discrimination against 
the subset of women who are Asian.  In this sense, same sex comparator 
evidence is always relevant in proving sex-plus discrimination, and should 
not be so easily discounted.237 
Even courts that seemingly mandate opposite sex comparator 
evidence have admitted the relevance of same sex comparator evidence.  
Recall that in Fisher,238 for example, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
found clear error in the district court’s reliance on plaintiff Fisher’s same 
sex comparator evidence,239 which the court described as “meaningless” in  
the absence of a proper “sex-to-sex comparison.”240  Despite this ruling, in  
other portions of its opinion, the Second Circuit recognized the usefulness 
of same sex comparator evidence.  The court emphasized, for example, that 
 
 236  See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 544 (1971) (declaring that Title VII 
“requires that persons of like qualifications be given employment opportunities irrespective 
of their sex,” such that the statute does not permit “one hiring policy for women and another 
for men”). 
 237  See FED. R. EVID. 401 (providing that “[e]vidence is relevant if: (a) it has any 
tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) 
the fact is of consequence in determining the action”); FED. R. EVID. 402 (stating that 
“[r]elevant evidence is [generally] admissible . . . .”); FED. R. EVID. 403 (stating the familiar 
rule that “[t]he court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the 
issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative 
evidence”). 
 238  Fisher v. Vassar Coll., 70 F.3d 1420 (2d Cir. 1995), aff’d en banc, 114 F.3d 1332 (2d 
Cir. 1997). 
 239  Id. at 1443.  
 240  Id. at 1446. 
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the plaintiff’s statistics, which had focused on her employer’s treatment of 
married versus single women in the “hard” sciences only, should have 
instead examined the employer’s treatment of married and single women in 
the college as a whole.241  Indeed, the Second Circuit declared, “[e]vidence 
of the treatment of married women throughout the college was highly 
relevant to a proper assessment of plaintiff’s [sex-plus] claim.”242  After all, 
if the employer in Fisher had treated all women alike, the plaintiff’s best 
argument would have been pure sex discrimination, rather than sex -plus-
marital status, again demonstrating the relevance of same sex comparator 
proof. 
B. Beyond Comparators:  Other Methods of Proving Sex-Plus 
Discrimination 
As noted, sex-plus discrimination claims typically allege disparate 
treatment discrimination, which requires proof of discriminatory intent.243  
For such claims, direct or circumstantial evidence may be used to prove the 
requisite intent.244  Comparator proof is simply one form of circumstantial 
evidence.245  Accordingly, the employer’s intent can be proven in  o ther 
 
 241  See id. at 1445 (finding the district court to have abused its discretion in failing to 
receive the defendant’s expert testimony on such college-wide data, and stating that the 
college-wide evidence excluded in the case “strongly suggests that . . . there was no 
discrimination against married women in the tenure review process”). 
 242  Id. at 1445.   
 243  See supra notes 33–36 and accompanying text. 
 244  See U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714 n.3 (1983) (“As 
in any lawsuit, the plaintiff may prove his case by direct or circumstantial evidence.  The 
trier of fact should consider all the evidence, giving it whatever weight and credence it 
deserves.”); Lewis v. City of Union City, Ga., 918 F.3d 1213, 1220 (11th Cir. 2019) (“In 
order to survive summary judgment, a plaintiff alleging intentional discrimination must 
present sufficient facts to permit a jury to rule in her favor.  One way that she can do so is by 
satisfying the burden-shifting framework set out in McDonnell Douglas.”); id. at 1220 n.6 
(noting further that, beyond the burden-shifting test of McDonnell Douglas, “[a] plaintiff 
can also present direct evidence of discriminatory intent, or demonstrate a ‘convincing 
mosaic’ of circumstantial evidence that warrants an inference of intentional discrimination”) 
(citations omitted); Darke v. Lurie Besikof Lapidus & Co., 550 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1040 (D. 
Minn. 2008) (explaining that there are basically two ways to prove sex discrimination: (1) 
the direct method, and (2) the indirect method described in McDonnell Douglas).  Notably, 
statistical evidence may be used as circumstantial evidence of the employer’s intent to 
discriminate, especially in systemic, pattern-or-practice cases.  See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters 
v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339–40 (1977) (affirming the use of statistical evidence in 
proving employment discrimination); Rioux v. City of Atlanta, Ga., 520 F.3d 1269, 1274 
(11th Cir. 2008) (noting that “[a] plaintiff may prove a claim of intentional discrimination 
through direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, or through statistical proof”); Fisher, 70 
F.3d at 1442 (recognizing that “[s]tatistics may be a part of a plaintiff’s effort to establish 
discrimination under a theory of disparate treatment”).  Nevertheless, a detailed analysis of 
such statistical proof is beyond the scope of this Article.   
 245  See Bass v. Chem. Banking Corp., No. 94 Civ. 8833 (SHS), 1996 WL 374151, at *6 
(S.D.N.Y. July 2, 1996); Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 
MCALLIS TER (DO NO T DELETE)  1/9/2020   4:21 PM 
2020] PROVING SEX-PLUS DISCRIMINATION  795 
ways, including through direct evidence of discrimination against a 
particular subgroup of males or females, or through other forms of 
circumstantial evidence (as a variety of sex-plus cases have established).246  
Thus, although some courts have stated that opposite sex comparator 
evidence is always required to prove sex-plus discrimination,247 this is 
incorrect.  Rather, when a sex-plus plaintiff lacks the requisite opposite sex 
comparator evidence, she may still prevail through other evidentiary 
methods.248  As one court recently declared, proof that an employer treated 
 
2011) (in a race discrimination case, stating that “the plaintiff’s failure to produce a 
comparator does not necessarily doom the plaintiff’s case,” “[r]ather, the plaintiff will 
always survive summary judgment” by presenting sufficient circumstantial evidence, which 
comes in “various forms,” of the employer’s discriminatory intent).  See also, e,g., Rioux, 
520 F.3d at 1277 (finding the plaintiff established a prima facie case of race discrimination 
through various items of circumstantial evidence, despite having no evidence of a 
comparator who was treated more favorably). 
 246  See, e.g., DeAngelo v. DentalEZ, Inc., 738 F. Supp. 2d 572, 584–86 (E.D. Pa. 2010) 
(stating that even in the absence of opposite sex comparator evidence, a plaintiff “may still 
proceed on a sex-plus theory if she has direct record evidence of gender discrimination”); 
Rauw v. Glickman, No. CV-99-1482-ST, 2001 WL 34039494, at *11 (D. Or. Aug. 6, 2001) 
(denying summary judgment to the defendant on the plaintiff’s sex-plus-marital status 
claim, and noting that plaintiff’s direct evidence “establishes a genuine issue of material fact 
as to whether improper sex plus marital status discrimination was a factor in the elimination 
of [plaintiff’s] position”); Nesselrotte v. Allegheny Energy, Inc., No. 06-01390, 2009 WL 
703395, at *11 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 16, 2009) (in a sex-plus-dependent children claim, requiring 
a female plaintiff to present evidence regarding the corresponding subclass of men, but 
noting that the plaintiff could rely on evidence “of any other circumstances, such as 
impermissible stereotyping, that raise an inference of gender discrimination under Title 
VII”) (citing Back, 365 F.3d at 122); McGrenaghan v. St. Denis Sch., 979 F. Supp. 323, 327 
(E.D. Pa. 1997) (finding ample evidence of a prima facie case of sex-plus discrimination 
claim brought by a female with a disabled child, despite no opposite sex comparator 
evidence, based on evidence that the person hired over her was a female without a disabled 
child and due to discriminatory statements targeting working mothers and mothers with 
disabled children) (discussed supra notes 171–179); Bass, 1996 WL 374151 at *6 (finding 
that a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of discrimination, and permit a factfinder to 
infer a discriminatory motive, based not only on opposite sex comparator evidence, but also 
by “demonstrating that . . . her performance was criticized in gender-specific language,” 
“the employer made invidious remarks about other members of the protected class,” or that 
“the sequence of events leading up to the discharge or the timing of the discharge raises an 
inference of discrimination”) (citations omitted).  Cf. Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & 
Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344, 350, 351 (6th Cir. 1998) (recognizing that a plaintiff may prove 
discrimination, even in the absence of comparator evidence, through direct, circumstantial, 
or statistical evidence tending to show that the employer singled out the plaintiff for 
impermissible reasons). 
 247  See supra Part III.  Recall that in Coleman, for example, the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals declared that “gender-plus plaintiffs can never be successful if there is no 
corresponding subclass of members of the opposite gender,” because without such 
comparator evidence, sex-plus “plaintiffs cannot make the requisite showing that they were 
treated differently from similarly situated members of the opposite gender,” a key 
component of any “sex” discrimination claim.  Coleman v. B–G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., 
Inc,, 108 F.3d 1199, 1204 (10th Cir. 1997).   
 248  Johnston v. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n, No. 08-CV-0296 PJS/RLE, 2009 WL 2900352, at 
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an opposite sex comparator better than a sex-plus plaintiff “would be one 
way for [a plaintiff] to prove sex-plus discrimination, but it would not be 
the only way.”249 
According to most courts, circumstantial evidence of discrimination—
which includes comparator proof—is only required where direct evidence 
of discriminatory intent is lacking.250 
For this reason, courts often address whether direct evidence of 
discriminatory intent is present before examining comparator proof.251  
Thus, it is no surprise that courts have validated sex-plus claims based on 
direct evidence of discrimination, even where opposite sex comparator 
evidence is lacking.252 
Perhaps the most common form of direct evidence in sex-plus cases is 
stereotypical remarks about women with children and their perceived 
capacity to be good employees.  In Back, for example, the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals found that Back could prove her sex-plus claim solely 
through evidence of stereotypical remarks about the ability of women with 
children to be good employees,253 which the court described as direct 
evidence of discriminatory intent.254  As the Back court declared, 
“stereotyping of women as caregivers can by itself and without more be 
evidence of an impermissible, sex-based motive.”255 
The First Circuit Court of Appeals reached the same result in 
Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc.256  In that case, the First Circuit overturned the 
district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendant -employer on 
the plaintiff’s sex-plus claim alleging she did not receive a promotion 
 
*9 (D. Minn. Sept. 2, 2009). 
 249  Id.  See also Goldberg, supra note 15, at 751 (arguing that compartor evidence is just 
one way of discerning an act of discrimination). 
 250  See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985) (“[T]he 
McDonnell Douglas test is inapplicable where the plaintiff presents direct evidence of 
discrimination[.]”); Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 38, 58 (1st Cir. 1999) 
(describing the “the purpose” of “the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine framework” as “allowing 
plaintiffs to prove discrimination by circumstantial evidence”).  See also supra note 49. 
 251  See, e.g., supra note 218 (discussing Philipsen v. Univ. of Mich. Bd. of Regents, No. 
06-CV-11977-DT, 2007 WL 907822 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 22, 2007)). 
 252  See supra note 244 (listing cases). 
 253  See supra notes 187–200 and accompanying text. 
 254  Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch., Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 119, 124 (2d Cir. 
2004) (describing the alleged stereotypical comments about a woman’s inability to combine 
work and motherhood as “direct evidence” of discrimination).   
 255  Id. at 122.  Later still, the court reiterated this point when discussing the 
requirements of the McDonnell Douglas test.  See id. at 124 (“[A]s with the first stage of 
McDonnell Douglas, Back is not required to provide evidence that similarly situated men 
were treated differently.”). 
 256  Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 2009).   
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because she was the mother of young children.257  Importantly, the court 
reached this result even though the person who received the promotion over 
her was also a mother with young children.258  Thus, without any 
comparator evidence, and even despite the employer’s favorable treatment 
of another female sharing the same plus characteristic as the plaintiff, 
which arguably undercut the plaintiff’s claim,259 the Chadwick plaintiff was 
still able to survive summary judgment based solely on stereotypical 
comments suggesting that the plaintiff would not devote herself to her job 
due to childcare responsibilities.260 
Numerous other courts have also noted the ability of sex-plus 
plaintiffs to prove their claims with direct evidence, without the need f or 
opposite sex comparator proof.261  Accordingly, stereotypical comments 
such as those at issue in Back and Chadwick are simply another means, 
apart from comparator proof, of raising an inference of sex discrimination, 
a point made clear by the Supreme Court’s decision in Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins.262 
In Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court ruled that Title VII’s 
prohibition of sex discrimination encompasses employment decisions based 
on gender stereotypes.263  In that case, plaintiff Ann Hopkins, a female 
senior manager in an accounting firm, was denied partnership because she 
was considered “too macho.”  Along these lines, the plaintiff was told she 
could improve her chances of partnership if she were to “take a course at 
charm school,” “walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more 
 
 257  Id. at 40–41.   
 258  At the time of the promotion decision, plaintiff Laurie Chadwick was the mother of 
an eleven-year-old son and six-year-old triplets in kindergarten.  Id. at 42.  The person who 
received the promotion over Chadwick, Donna Ouelette, was apparently the mother of two 
children, ages nine and fourteen.  Id. at 41–42.  In rejecting the defendant’s argument that 
hiring Ouelette tended to defeat any sex-plus claim Chadwick might assert based on the fact 
of her having children, the court noted a possible distinction between Chadwick, who had 
four children, and Ouelette, who had only two.  See id. at 42–43 n.4 (noting further that no 
evidence suggested the defendant-employer actually knew of Ouelette’s status as a mother 
of two children, while it is uncontested that the defendant-employer knew of Chadwick’s 
children, and stating that, regardless, “discrimination against one employee cannot be 
remedied solely by nondiscrimination against another employee in that same group”).  
 259  See Fuller v. GTE Corp./Contel Cellular, Inc., 926 F. Supp. 653, 657 (M.D. Tenn. 
1996)  (rejecting the plaintiff’s sex-plus-parental status claim and noting the fact “[t]hat 
[p]laintiff was replaced by another female—indeed, by another mother—is simply one 
factor which helps to defeat [p]laintiff’s claim”). 
 260  See Chadwick, 561 F.3d at 46–48. 
 261  See supra note 244. 
 262  Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (stating that “stereotyped 
remarks can certainly be evidence that gender played a part” in an adverse employment 
decision) (emphasis in original). 
 263  Id. at 250–52. 
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femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.”264  The 
Supreme Court ruled that such comments could support a Title VII claim of 
sex discrimination, thereby establishing that Title VII prohibits sex 
discrimination in the form of sex stereotyping.265  As the Back  court later 
declared, “[i]t is the law, then, that ‘stereotyped remarks can certainly be 
evidence that gender played a part’ in an adverse employment decision.”266 
As courts and commentators have noted, the stereotyping directed at 
Ann Hopkins, who was denied partnership for failing to look and act the 
way a woman should look and act, followed the supposition that a woman 
is unqualified for a position because she does not conform to a gender 
stereotype.267  This is distinct from more traditional forms of stereotyping 
in discrimination cases, more commonly at issue in sex-plus cases, in 
which an employer assumes a person will be a bad employee simply 
because she has certain qualities (such as being married, or having 
children), and takes an adverse action against her due to that stereotypical 
assumption.268 
This brings us back to Coleman, where the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals declared that “gender-plus plaintiffs can never be successful if  
there is no corresponding subclass of members of the opposite gender,” 
because in that event, sex-plus plaintiffs “cannot make the requisite 
showing that they were treated differently from similarly situated members 
of the opposite gender.”269  This is incorrect, and should not be regarded as 
the law in sex-plus cases.270 
To explain, it is certainly true that a female plaintiff alleging sex-plus 
discrimination must establish that she was discriminated against based on 
her sex, “which is, analytically, equivalent to establishing that a similarly 
situated man would not have been discriminated against if such a man 
 
 264  Id. at 235 (internal citations omitted). 
 265  Id. at 250 (“In the specific context of sex stereotyping, an employer who acts on the 
basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the 
basis of gender.”).   
 266  Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch., Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 119 (2d Cir. 
2004) (quoting Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251). 
 267  See id.; Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1262 (11th Cir. 2017) 
(Rosenbaum, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that the accounting firm 
in Price Waterhouse denied Hopkins’s partnership because “she had qualities that defied 
stereotypes of how women should look and act”).  See also Zachary R. Herz, Price’s 
Progress: Sex Stereotyping and Its Potential for Antidiscrimination Law, 124 YALE L.J. 
396, 406–07 (2014) (describing Price Waterhouse). 
 268  See Back, 365 F.3d at 119.  See also Herz, supra note 267 (describing the type of 
stereotyping at issue in Hopkins as “prescriptive stereotyping,” and the type of stereotyping 
at issue in a sex-plus case like Phillips as “ascriptive stereotyping”). 
 269  Coleman v. B–G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 108 F.3d 1199, 1204 (10th Cir. 1997). 
 270  See Johnston v. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n, No. 08-CV-0296 PJS/RLE, 2009 WL 
2900352, at *9 n.11 (D. Minn. Sept. 2, 2009) (explaining the flaws in this statement). 
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existed.”271  “[I]t does not follow that [the sex-plus plaintiff] must be able 
to prove that a particular similarly situated man was in fact treated better 
than she,”272 however, as this ignores the lessons of Price Waterhouse  and 
sex-plus cases like Chadwick and Back, which permit a plaintiff to  prove 
sex discrimination in other ways.273  Accordingly, although a plaintiff 
might attempt to prove sex-plus discrimination with evidence that an 
employer has in fact treated similarly situated males and females 
differently, other types of evidence—even including other forms of 
circumstantial evidence—can accomplish the same result.274 
Notably, when one examines the stereotyped comments in  sex -plus 
cases like Chadwick and Back, embedded within those comments are hints 
of opposite sex and same sex comparator evidence, thereby generating a 
similar inference of discriminatory intent and providing the requisite 
evidence of differential treatment between the sexes.  Suppose, for 
example, that an employer makes the following comment to a female 
employee who just had a child: “You are the best credit analyst we have 
ever had, and you were especially great before you started having kids.  
Although I don’t mind when men with children work, I really don’t think 
that women with children should be working, so I’ve decided to  f ire you 
immediately.  Please collect your belongings and go.”275  Undoubtedly, if  
these events occurred, a reasonable jury could find that the plaintiff was 
fired because of her sex.276  After all, the employer’s comment alone is 
 
 271  Id. at *9.  
 272  Id. 
 273  See Back, 365 F.3d at 119 (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 
(1989)). 
 274  See King v. Ferguson Enters., Inc., 971 F. Supp. 2d 1200, 1217 (N.D. Ga. 2013) 
(stating that plaintiffs in the Eleventh Circuit “can establish a prima facie case—without 
identifying a similarly situated comparator—by offering circumstantial evidence that 
suggests their employer intentionally discriminated against them ‘with a force similar to that 
implied by treating nearly identical offenders differently’”) (quoting Bell v. Crowne Mgmt., 
LLC, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1234 (S.D. Ala. 2012)); see also Fisher v. Vassar Coll., 70 F.3d 
1420, 1447 n.12 (2d Cir. 1995) (recognizing that when evidence shows “there are no 
[similarly situated] males [with the same plus factor at issue] and that it is unlikely that there 
would be any, then it may be that the complainant would be able to prevail by providing 
some other evidence of discrimination”), aff’d en banc, 114 F.3d 1332 (2d Cir. 1997).  Even 
proof of pretext can constitute evidence that an employer was motivated by discriminatory 
animus, as opposed to whatever alternative motivation the employer presents.  See Reeves v. 
Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000) (stating that “[p]roof that the 
defendant’s explanation is unworthy of credence is simply one form of circumstantial 
evidence that is probative of intentional discrimination, and it may be quite persuasive,” as 
this proof allows a trier of fact to “reasonably infer from the falsity of the explanation that 
the employer is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory purpose”). 
 275  This hypothetical is adapted from a similar scenario provided in Johnston, 2009 WL 
2900352 at *7. 
 276  Id. at *9. 
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evidence that the plaintiff was fired not because of her abilities, but rather 
because of her sex in combination with her parental status.  As the quoted 
comment alone suggests, men with children and women without children 
would not have suffered the same consequences.  Thus, it is simply 
incorrect to state, as the Tenth Circuit has declared, that “gender-plus 
plaintiffs can never be successful if there is no corresponding subclass of 
members of the opposite gender.”277 
Aside from the failure to account for other forms of persuasive 
evidence, the Tenth Circuit’s rule unnecessarily hamstrings plaintiffs who 
are unlucky enough to have any opposite sex comparators in their 
workforce, a problem that can be particularly acute when sex-plus 
discrimination is alleged (given its level of specificity).278  This point was 
made explicit in a recent First Circuit Court of Appeals decision applying 
the sex-plus doctrine in a case alleging a sexually hostile work 
environment, Franchina v. City of Providence.279 
In Franchina, a former Providence, Rhode Island, employee, Lori 
Franchina, sued the City asserting a Title VII sexual harassment claim. 280  
After losing at trial,281 the City argued on appeal that Franchina f ailed to  
present sufficient evidence under a sex-plus theory because she fa iled to  
“identify a corresponding sub-class of the opposite gender and show that 
the corresponding class was not subject to similar harassment or 
discrimination.”282  The First Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the City’s 
argument for numerous reasons.283  First, the court declared that the City’s 
argument, if accepted, “would permit employers to discriminate free from 
Title VII recourse so long as they do not employ any subclass member of 
the opposite gender,” a result that would “be inapposite to Title VII’s 
 
 277  Coleman v. B–G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 108 F.3d 1199, 1204 (10th Cir. 1997).  
 278  See Franchina v. City of Providence, 881 F.3d 32, 52−53 (1st Cir. 2018).  See also 
Goldberg, supra note 15, at 764–65 (arguing that plaintiffs in “trait-plus cases” are 
particularly unlikely to find an adequate comparator in their workforce).   
 279  See id. at 45−46 (summarizing Franchina’s claims).  See also Brief of Plaintiff-
Appellee Lori Franchina at 26, Franchina, 881 F.3d 32 (2017) (No. 16-2401). 
 280  Franchina, 881 F.3d at 37, 45−46. 
 281  Id. at 37−38. 
 282  Id. at 52.  More specifically, the City argued, Franchina “is required to have 
presented evidence at trial of a comparative class of gay male firefighters who were not 
discriminated against,” because without such evidence, “it would not be possible to prove 
that any sort of differential treatment a plaintiff experiences is necessarily predicated on his 
or her gender.”  Id. 
 283  See id. at 52 (stating that the City’s argument “has some rather obvious flaws”).  But 
see Coleman v. B–G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 108 F.3d 1199, 1202–04  (10th Cir. 1997) 
(ruling in a sex-plus-marital status claim that a female plaintiff must show that her male co-
workers with the same marital status were treated differently, and reversing jury verdict for 
the plaintiff due to a lack of evidence on that point). 
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mandate against sex-based discrimination.”284  In a related point, the court 
declared that “Title VII is not to be diluted because discrimination 
adversely affects a plaintiff who is unlucky enough to lack a comparator in  
his or her workplace.”285 
In the final analysis, sex discrimination claims require proof that “the 
employer actually relied on [plaintiff’s] gender in making its decision,” 286 
or more simply, that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the 
plaintiff “because of” her sex.287  What matters most, then, is not whether 
the plaintiff can generate evidence of how the employer treated an opposite 
sex comparator, but rather whether the plaintiff can show that her gender 
motivated the employer.288  Opposite sex comparator evidence is one 
means of establishing the requisite intent, but it is not the only means.289 
 
 284  Franchina, 881 F.3d at 52–53.  See also King, 971 F. Supp. 2d at 1209, 1217 
(making a similar point, and stating that permitting a defendant to escape liability for having 
no comparator in its workforce “is not now, nor has it ever been, the law in [the Eleventh 
C]ircuit”). 
 285  Franchina, 881 F.3d at 53.  The court additionally declared that the City’s proposed 
comparator requirement “conflicts . . . with Title VII’s text and jurisprudence.”  Id.  The 
court explained: 
Requiring a plaintiff to point to a comparator of the opposite gender implies 
the inquiry is that of “but-for” causation.  That is to say, the City’s approach 
requires Franchina to make a showing that, all else being equal (the “plus” 
factors being the same), the discrimination would not have occurred but for 
her gender.  Title VII requires no such proof.  The text bars discrimination 
when sex is “a motivating factor,” not “the motivating factor.” 
Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)). 
 286  Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 252 (1989). 
 287  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2018) (making it unlawful for an employer to take 
certain adverse actions against an individual “because of such individual’s . . . sex”); U.S. 
Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983) (stating that “[t]he 
‘factual inquiry’ in a Title VII case is ‘whether the defendant intentionally discriminated 
against the plaintiff’”) (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 
(1981)).  
 288  See Goldberg, supra note 15, at 777–78 (arguing that plaintiffs ought to be able to 
prove discrimination even in cases where comparison is not possible).  It remains arguably 
unclear whether Title VII’s “motivating factor” provision applies in so-called single motive 
claims, as well as mixed motive claims.  See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 94 
n.1 (2003) (“This case does not require us to decide when, if ever, § 107 applies outside of 
the mixed-motive context.”).  At least two circuit courts, however, have applied the standard 
in single motive claims.  See Franchina, 881 F.3d at 53; Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 
F.3d 838, 853−54 (9th Cir. 2002) (discussing the issue and concluding that “the plaintiff in 
any Title VII case may establish a violation through a preponderance of evidence (whether 
direct or circumstantial) that a protected characteristic played ‘a motivating factor’” in the 
employer’s adverse action). 
 289  See Johnston v. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n, No. 08-CV-0296 PJS/RLE, 2009 WL 
2900352, at *9 (D. Minn. Sept. 2, 2009); see also Fisher v. Vassar Coll., 70 F.3d 1420, 1447 
n.12 (2d Cir. 1995) (recognizing that when “the complainant establishes by evidence that 
there are no [similarly situated] males [with the same plus factor at issue] and that it is 
unlikely that there would be any, then it may be that the complainant would be able to 
MCALLIS TER (DO NO T DELETE)  1/9/2020   4:20 PM 
802 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:757 
Finally, as between direct and circumstantial evidence, Title VII does 
not require, or even prefer, one or the other when proving the ultimate fact 
of discrimination.  This much was made clear in the 1991 amendments to  
Title VII, which set forth a “motivating factor” standard without any 
mention of direct or circumstantial evidence,290 as well as the Supreme 
Court’s subsequent ruling in Desert Palace, which held that direct evidence 
of discrimination is not required to prove a mixed motive claim. 291  It is 
also reflected in standard jury instructions that ascribe the same weight to  
direct and circumstantial evidence.292  Moreover, although courts have 
traditionally channeled direct and indirect evidence into distinct 
frameworks,293 more recent decisions have begun allowing a plaintiff to  
present both types of evidence in a unified attempt to prove the requisite 
discriminatory intent.294  In sum, evidence is evidence, and what matters 
most is its relevancy and persuasiveness, regardless of its label.295 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This Article has considered the role of comparator evidence in proving 
sex-plus discrimination.  Although some courts have declared that sex-plus 
plaintiffs can never be successful without proof  of how the employer 
treated the corresponding subclass of opposite sex individuals, this is 
analytically incorrect and should not be adopted as the law, given that there 
are other forms of evidence equally capable of proving the requisite 
discriminatory intent.  Nevertheless, in those instances when a sex-plus 
plaintiff attempts to prove her claim solely through comparator evidence, 
 
prevail by providing some other evidence of discrimination”), aff’d en banc, 114 F.3d 1332 
(2d Cir. 1997). 
 290  42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(m); Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 98–99.  See also Costa, 299 
F.3d at 853–54 (concluding that “the plaintiff in any Title VII case may establish a violation 
through a preponderance of evidence (whether direct or circumstantial) that a protected 
characteristic played ‘a motivating factor’” in the employer’s adverse action). 
 291  See Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 101–02; Costa, 299 F.3d at 853–54. 
 292  See ELEVENTH CIR. PATTERN JURY INSTR. - CIV. § 3.3 (2019) (defining “direct” and 
“circumstantial” evidence and explaining that “[t]here’s no legal difference in the weight 
you may give to either direct or circumstantial evidence”). 
 293  See, e.g., Philipsen v. Univ. of Mich. Bd. of Regents, No. 06-CV-11977-DT, 2007 
WL 907822 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 22, 2007). 
 294  See, e.g., Oritz v. Werner Enter. Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 765–66 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding, 
in part, that courts in the Seventh Circuit “must stop separating ‘direct’ from ‘indirect’ 
evidence and proceeding as if they were subject to different legal standards,” and stating 
that “all evidence belongs in a single pile and must be evaluated as a whole”). 
 295  See generally Johnston v. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n, No. 08-CV-0296 PJS/RLE, 2009 
WL 2900352, at *9 (D. Minn. Sept. 2, 2009).  Cf. Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 100 (quoting 
Rogers v. Mo. Pac. R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 508 n.17 (1957)) (“The reason for treating 
circumstantial and direct evidence alike is both clear and deep rooted: ‘Circumstantial 
evidence is not only sufficient, but may also be more certain, satisfying and persuasive than 
direct evidence.’”). 
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opposite sex comparator evidence is vital because without such evidence, it 
would be impossible to prove that the plaintiff’s sex played a factor in  the 
employer’s decision, a necessary component of any sex discrimination 
claim.  When combined with opposite sex comparator evidence, same sex 
comparator evidence can then be used to prove that the employer does not 
engage in sex discrimination across-the-board, but rather employs a more 
specific sex-based animus targeting only a particular subgroup of male or 
female employees, thereby establishing the claim as a sex-plus claim rather 
than a pure sex discrimination claim.  For this reason, this Article has 
shown that the strongest sex-plus discrimination claims are those where the 
two types of comparator evidence are used in tandem, an approach courts 
should more readily allow. 
 
